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Arthapatti is the presumption of something for the explanation of a known fact. The word arthaapatti gies under various translations as presumption, postulation, supposition, implication, and assumption. When a given or perceived fact cannot be explained without some other fact we have to presuppose or postulate the existence of this other fact even though we do not perceive it. Example : when a particular person named Chaitra, known to be alive, is not found in his house, it is assumed that he must be somewhere outside.  What is presumed is said to be a distinct source of knowledge.

Arthapatti is the presumption of something for the explanation of a known fact. The word arthaapatti gies under various translations as presumption, postulation, supposition, implication, and assumption. When a given or perceived fact cannot be explained without some other fact we have to presuppose or postulate the existence of this other fact even though we do not perceive it. Example : when a particular person named Chaitra, known to be alive, is not found in his house, it is assumed that he must be somewhere outside.  What is presumed is said to be a distinct source of knowledge.

==Anupalabdhi Pramana==

==Anupalabdhi Pramana==

Knowledge by which we immediately cognize the non-existence of an object, e.g. absence of rainfall indicates that the connection of cloud and the wind has not happened.

 

Knowledge by which we immediately cognize the non-existence of an object, e.g. absence of rainfall indicates that the connection of cloud and the wind has not happened. <ref name=":42">M. Chandraiah. (2002) Ph. D. Thesis Title : ''[http://hdl.handle.net/10603/71380 Anupalabdhi as a Pramana. A Critical Study.]'' Tirupati : Venkateswara University</ref>

== Pramanas in Astika Darshanas ==

== Pramanas in Astika Darshanas ==

It is generally admitted by all the schools of philosophy that pramaa is the true knowledge and pramaana is the source of such knowledge. However, difference of opinions exist as to the the nature of the truth which each of them claims for its pramaana.

It is generally admitted by all the schools of philosophy that pramaa is the true knowledge and pramaana is the source of such knowledge. However, difference of opinions exist as to the the nature of the truth which each of them claims for its pramaana.

Further Anumana or Inference is explained. There is a certain relationship which is common (अनुवृत्तिः) to all homogenous objects (तुल्यजातीयेषु) and dissociated (व्यावृत्तः) from the heterogenous ones (भिन्नजातीयेषु). Anumana is that function having the above said relationship for its object concerned chiefly with the ascertainment (अवधारणप्रधाना) of its generic attribute. For e.g. a person, say Chaitra, changes his position only through movement. Similarly when we see planets changing their positions we infer that there is movement, just like in Chaitra, which cannot be perceived. On the other hand, Vidhya mountain does not change its position so we infer that there is no movement.  

Further Anumana or Inference is explained. There is a certain relationship which is common (अनुवृत्तिः) to all homogenous objects (तुल्यजातीयेषु) and dissociated (व्यावृत्तः) from the heterogenous ones (भिन्नजातीयेषु). Anumana is that function having the above said relationship for its object concerned chiefly with the ascertainment (अवधारणप्रधाना) of its generic attribute. For e.g. a person, say Chaitra, changes his position only through movement. Similarly when we see planets changing their positions we infer that there is movement, just like in Chaitra, which cannot be perceived. On the other hand, Vidhya mountain does not change its position so we infer that there is no movement.  

Yoga holds that pramana is the function of chitta. Samkhya considers knowledge as belonging to buddhi only, which though essentially is insentient, acts like a sentient entity when the sentience of Purusha is reflected upon it. Both these systems offer an original definition of pramana as the function of the buddhi or chitta.  

Yoga holds that pramana is the function of chitta. Samkhya considers knowledge as belonging to buddhi only, which though essentially is insentient, acts like a sentient entity when the sentience of Purusha is reflected upon it. Both these systems offer an original definition of pramana as the function of the buddhi or chitta.