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Sensory Perception (Samskrit: प्रत्यक्ष-प्रमाणम्) is considered as one of the primary means of valid knowledge. It refers to the direct experience and cognition of objects through the five-senses, which are regarded as the initial and reliable source of knowledge about the external world.<ref name=":1">S.C.Chatterjee (1939), [https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.201767/page/n1/mode/1up?view=theater The Nyaya Theory of Knowledge], University of Calcutta.

Sensory Perception (Samskrit: प्रत्यक्ष-प्रमाणम्) is considered as one of the primary means of valid [[Jnana (ज्ञानम्)|knowledge]]. It refers to the direct experience and cognition of objects through the five-senses, which are regarded as the initial and reliable source of knowledge about the external world.<ref name=":1">S.C.Chatterjee (1939), [https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.201767/page/n1/mode/1up?view=theater The Nyaya Theory of Knowledge], University of Calcutta.

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==परिचयः॥ Introduction==

==परिचयः॥ Introduction==

[[File:Indriyarth sannikarsha .jpg|thumb|Image Courtesy: Image is generated by the Author Kritika Jain using canva.|alt=]]

[[File:Indriyarth sannikarsha .jpg|thumb|Image Courtesy: Image is generated by the Author Kritika Jain using canva.|alt=]]

The word perception originates from the Latin word “perceptio”  meaning receiving, collecting, gathering. This term is derived from the verb “percipere” which means “to perceive, to observe, to grasp.”

The word [[perception]] originates from the Latin word “perceptio”  meaning receiving, collecting, gathering. This term is derived from the verb “percipere” which means “to perceive, to observe, to grasp.”

In Indian Philosophy, Perception is one of the key means of acquiring knowledge, known as Pratyaksha. Pratyaksha refers to direct cognition or knowledge gained through the senses. It is considered as the mode or means to gain knowledge. In the process of perception, there are some technical terms -

In Indian Philosophy, Perception is one of the key means of acquiring knowledge, known as Pratyaksha. Pratyaksha refers to direct cognition or knowledge gained through the [[Indriyas (इन्द्रियाणि)|senses]]. It is considered as the mode or means to gain knowledge. In the process of perception, there are some technical terms -

*Prama - Valid knowledge or true cognition.

*Prama - Valid knowledge or true cognition.

*Pramana - Means or source of knowledge (eg. Perception, Inference).

*[[Pramana (प्रमाणम्)|Pramana]] - Means or source of knowledge (eg. Perception, [[Inference and its classification (अनुमानं तस्य प्रकाराश्च)|Inference]]).

* Prameya -  Object of Knowledge. The thing or fact which is known or to be known.

* Prameya -  Object of Knowledge. The thing or fact which is known or to be known.

*Pramata -  The person who gains the knowledge. Knower or the Subject.

*Pramata -  The person who gains the knowledge. Knower or the Subject.

According to Nyayashastra, there are four distinct and independent methods or sources of knowledge, namely, Perception (Pratyaksha), Inference (Anumana), Comparison or Analogy (Upamana) and  verbal testimony (Shabda).  

According to [[Nyaya Darshana (न्यायदर्शनम्)|Nyayashastra]], there are four distinct and independent methods or sources of knowledge, namely, Perception (Pratyaksha), Inference (Anumana), Comparison or Analogy ([[Upamana in Nyaya Philosophy(उपमानम्)|Upamana]]) and  verbal testimony (Shabda).  

# Perception: It means knowledge gained through direct contact of sense organs with objects.  

# Perception: It means knowledge gained through direct contact of sense organs with objects.  

# Verbal Testimony: In this, knowledge obtained through reliable authority or trustworthy verbal statement, especially the scriptures or words of a trustworthy person.

# Verbal Testimony: In this, knowledge obtained through reliable authority or trustworthy verbal statement, especially the scriptures or words of a trustworthy person.

There are certain objects which may be known by any of the four methods, there are other objects which must be known by a particular method and cannot be known by any other. Like, the existence of fire at a distant place may be known from the testimony of a reliable person or it may also be known by inference from the observed smoke as a mark of fire. Or, if we take the trouble to go up to the place from which smoke issues forth, we have a perception of the fire on the spot. Hence with regard to such objects as the fire, one method of knowledge is as good and valid as any other.

There are certain objects which may be known by any of the four methods, there are other objects which must be known by a particular method and cannot be known by any other. Like, the existence of fire at a distant place may be known from the testimony of a reliable person or it may also be known by inference from the observed smoke as a mark of fire. Or, if we take the trouble to go up to the place from which smoke issues forth, we have a perception of the fire on the spot. Hence, with regard to such objects as the [[Agni (अग्निः)|fire]], one method of knowledge is as good and valid as any other.

Perception gives us the knowledge of what is directly present to sense and we do not require any inference or testimony for a knowledge of it<ref name=":1" />.{{Citation needed}}

Perception gives us the knowledge of what is directly present to sense and we do not require any inference or testimony for a knowledge of it<ref name=":1" />.

==किं नाम प्रत्यक्षम् ॥ Definition of Perception==

==किं नाम प्रत्यक्षम् ॥ Definition of Perception==

There are certain important considerations in favour of the Naiyayika view that perception is the most primary and fundamental of all the sources of knowledge recognised in any system of philosophy. Perception is the ultimate ground of all knowledge. Although perception is not the sole source of knowledge, it serves as the fundamental basis for all other mode of acquiring knowledge. Hence, it is maintained that all alternative means of knowledge depend upon perception and ultimately are grounded in perceptual knowledge.  Inference, as a valid source of knowledge, derives its validity from perception. The initial step in the inferential process involves the observation of a mark or middle term (Linga or Hetu), followed by the recognition of its consistent and necessary relation to the major term (Sadhya). Thus, inference is formally defined as that cognition which is necessarily preceded by perceptual awareness (tatpurvaka-jnanam).

There are certain important considerations in favour of the Naiyayika view that perception is the most primary and fundamental of all the sources of knowledge recognised in any system of philosophy. Perception is the ultimate ground of all knowledge. Although perception is not the sole source of knowledge, it serves as the fundamental basis for all other mode of acquiring knowledge. Hence, it is maintained that all alternative means of knowledge depend upon perception and ultimately are grounded in perceptual knowledge.  Inference, as a valid source of knowledge, derives its validity from perception. The initial step in the inferential process involves the observation of a mark or middle term (Linga or Hetu), followed by the recognition of its consistent and necessary relation to the major term (Sadhya). Thus, inference is formally defined as that cognition which is necessarily preceded by perceptual awareness (tatpurvaka-jnanam).

Similarly, upamana or comparison serves as a means of knowledge by enabling identification through the perceived similarities between two entities like a known and an unfamiliar object. Through this observed resemblance, the unknown is understood and appropriately named in relation to the known. Also, Shabda or verbal testimony is ultimately dependent upon perception as it begins with the sensory reception of linguistic expression or spoken words, whether heard or seen. The validity of such knowledge depends on the authority of the speaker, who must possess direct or intuitive insight into the subject. Thus, perception stands as the fundamental basis for all forms of knowledge - whether it is inferential, comparative or testimonial. So, it becomes clear that perception  underlies all other pramanas, including inference (anumana), comparison (upamana) and verbal testimony (shabda), serving as their ultimate foundation.<ref name=":1" />

Similarly, upamana or comparison serves as a means of knowledge by enabling identification through the perceived similarities between two entities like a known and an unfamiliar object. Through this observed resemblance, the unknown is understood and appropriately named in relation to the known. Also, Shabda or verbal testimony is ultimately dependent upon perception as it begins with the sensory reception of linguistic expression or spoken words, whether heard or seen. The validity of such knowledge depends on the authority of the speaker, who must possess direct or intuitive insight into the subject. Thus, perception stands as the fundamental basis for all forms of knowledge - whether it is inferential, comparative or testimonial. So, it becomes clear that perception underlies all other pramanas, including inference (anumana), comparison (upamana) and verbal testimony (shabda), serving as their ultimate foundation.<ref name=":1" />

==यूरोपीय-मतानुसारं प्रत्यक्षम् ॥ The European definition of Perception==

==यूरोपीय-मतानुसारं प्रत्यक्षम् ॥ The European definition of Perception==

Jain epistemology recognizes Pratyaksha (Perception) as a form of knowledge that is direct and immediate. It is classified into two categories:-

Jain epistemology recognizes Pratyaksha (Perception) as a form of knowledge that is direct and immediate. It is classified into two categories:-

# Mukhya Pratyaksha (Primary Perception) - This is direct knowledge that is entirely independent on the senses and the mind. It originates direct from the self. So, it is free from dependence.

# Mukhya Pratyaksha (Primary Perception) - This is direct knowledge that is entirely independent on the senses and the [[Manas (मनः)|mind]]. It originates direct from the self. So, it is free from dependence.

# Samvyavaharika Pratyaksha (Practical or Empirical Perception) – This type of perception is conditioned by the mind and the senses. Though it involves the mind and the senses, it still provides direct awareness of objects.<ref name=":1" />

# Samvyavaharika Pratyaksha (Practical or Empirical Perception) – This type of perception is conditioned by the mind and the senses. Though it involves the mind and the senses, it still provides direct awareness of objects.<ref name=":1" />

Modern philosophers do not accept the traditional explanation of perception based entirely on sense-object contact. Gangesha, regarded as the founder of the modern Nyaya, raises several objection to the older definition of perception. He first argues that the definition is too general, since it also applies to inference and memory, where the mind functions as an internal sense in relation to that particular known object. Secondly, the definition is also too much narrow or restricted as it fails to explain the divine omniscience. God’s knowledge is direct and non-sensory awareness of all truth and reality, cannot be explained through the requirement of sense-object contact. If perception necessarily involves the senses, then divine cognition would not qualify as perception at all.

Modern philosophers do not accept the traditional explanation of perception based entirely on sense-object contact. Gangesha, regarded as the founder of the modern Nyaya, raises several objection to the older definition of perception. He first argues that the definition is too general, since it also applies to inference and memory, where the mind functions as an internal sense in relation to that particular known object. Secondly, the definition is also too much narrow or restricted as it fails to explain the divine omniscience. God’s knowledge is direct and non-sensory awareness of all truth and reality, cannot be explained through the requirement of sense-object contact. If perception necessarily involves the senses, then divine cognition would not qualify as perception at all.

Modern Naiyayikas redefine perception as immediate knowledge. The defining feature of all perception is its immediacy, which is consistently present across different sensory experiences. Another definition of perception, given by the modern Naiyayikas is that it is knowledge which is not brought about by the instrumentality of any antecedent knowledge. This definition applies to all cases of perception, human or divine. At the same time, this definition excludes other forms of knowledge, such as inference, analogy and verbal testimony. Also, memory is dependent on prior direct experience (pūrvānubhava) for its origin. Perception, on the other hand, does not depend on past experiences in the same way, but that doesn’t mean  past experience do not affect how we perceive.

Modern Naiyayikas redefine perception as immediate knowledge. The defining feature of all perception is its immediacy, which is consistently present across different sensory experiences. Another definition of perception, given by the modern Naiyayikas is that it is knowledge which is not brought about by the instrumentality of any antecedent knowledge. This definition applies to all cases of perception, human or divine. At the same time, this definition excludes other forms of knowledge, such as inference, analogy and verbal testimony. Also, memory is dependent on prior direct experience (purvanubhava) for its origin. Perception, on the other hand, does not depend on past experiences in the same way, but that doesn’t mean  past experience do not affect how we perceive.

Among the two accounts of perception presented, the modern Nyaya’s perspective is more acceptable and seems easy to agree with. Hence, the modern Nyaya hits upon  a truth when it defines perception as immediate knowledge, although it recognises the fact that perception is generally conditioned by sense-object contact.<ref name=":1" />

Among the two accounts of perception presented, the modern Nyaya’s perspective is more acceptable and seems easy to agree with. Hence, the modern Nyaya hits upon  a truth when it defines perception as immediate knowledge, although it recognises the fact that perception is generally conditioned by sense-object contact.<ref name=":1" />

==References==

==References==

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