Changes

Shabdabodha (Samskrit : शाब्दबोधः) refers to the awareness and information of things hitherto unknown (to the listeners), to convey which, a speaker utters words generated by shabda arranged in intelligible sentences. The awareness generated by such shabda — in the form of a sentence – is called "Shabdabodha", which is cognition of sentence meaning or awareness of the relation (of word-meanings). Almost all schools of darshanas, vyakarana and alankara shastras have dealt with this topic extensively.<ref name=":0">Dr. N. S. Ramanuja Tatacharya. (2005) ''[https://archive.org/details/ShabdaBodhamimansaAnInquiryIntoIndianTheoriesOfVerbalCognitionN.S.RamanujaTatacharya/page/n39 Shabdabodhamimamsa. An Inquiry into Indian Theories of Verbal Cognition. Volume 1: The Sentence and its Significance.]'' New Delhi : Rastriya Sanskrit Samsthan</ref>

Shabdabodha (Samskrit : शाब्दबोधः) refers to the awareness and information of things hitherto unknown (to the listeners), to convey which, a speaker utters words generated by shabda arranged in intelligible sentences. The awareness generated by such shabda — in the form of a sentence – is called "Shabdabodha", which is cognition of sentence meaning or awareness of the relation (of word-meanings). Almost all schools of darshanas, vyakarana and alankara shastras have dealt with this topic extensively.<ref name=":0">Dr. N. S. Ramanuja Tatacharya. (2005) ''[https://archive.org/details/ShabdaBodhamimansaAnInquiryIntoIndianTheoriesOfVerbalCognitionN.S.RamanujaTatacharya/page/n39 Shabdabodhamimamsa. An Inquiry into Indian Theories of Verbal Cognition. Volume 1: The Sentence and its Significance.]'' New Delhi : Rastriya Sanskrit Samsthan</ref>

== परिचयः ॥ Introduction ==

== परिचयः ॥ Introduction ==

== ज्ञानम् ॥ Cognition ==

== ज्ञानम् ॥ Cognition ==

अर्थः (Artha) means purpose, meaning, wealth etc. Here with reference to the present context of "meaning" it is of two types - वस्तु (real) and बौद्धार्थ (imaginary). Generally, the word ज्ञानम् (Jnanam) is used to relate to the concept of Cognition whereas knowledge is represented by the word विज्ञानम् (Vijnanam).  

अर्थः (Artha) means purpose, meaning, wealth etc. Here with reference to the present context of "meaning" it is of two types - वस्तु (real) and बौद्धार्थ (imaginary). Generally, the word ज्ञानम् (Jnanam) is used to relate to the concept of Cognition whereas knowledge is represented by the word विज्ञानम् (Vijnanam).<ref name=":1" />

 

 

== वाक्यार्थज्ञानम् ॥ Vakyarthajnana ==

== वाक्यार्थज्ञानम् ॥ Vakyarthajnana ==

वाक्यार्थज्ञानम् (Vakyarthajnana) or शाब्दबोध (Shabdabodha) means verbal comprehension, is the outcome of knowledge of the meanings in a sentence. Shabdabodha is the purpose or result of Shabda Pramana. A sentence or proposition consists chiefly of two parts: a subject (उद्देश्यः) about which is the  context and a predicate (विधेय) which is a clause or words that tell something about the subject.  

वाक्यार्थज्ञानम् (Vakyarthajnana) or शाब्दबोध (Shabdabodha) means verbal comprehension, is the outcome of knowledge of the meanings in a sentence. Shabdabodha is the purpose or result of Shabda Pramana. A sentence or proposition consists chiefly of two parts: a subject (उद्देश्यः) about which is the  context and a predicate (विधेय) which is a clause or words that tell something about the subject.<ref name=":72" />

According to the '''Nyaya siddhanta''' the meaning of the subjective part in the nominative case (प्रथमान्तार्थः) is the principal concept (the मुख्यविशेष्यः), to which the meanings of all other words join up directly or indirectly. However, an additional element is conveyed by the sentence as a whole over and above the concepts of the different words. There is the intended relation of the various individual concepts (पदार्थसंसर्ग), which is brought forth not by the significative force of the words, but by the syntactic juxtaposition of the various words. A sentence like चैत्रः पद्भ्यां ग्रामं गच्छति would give rise to a शाब्दबोध like पादकरणक-ग्रामकर्मक-वर्तमानकालीनगमनाभिन्न-कृतिमान् चैत्रः in its simplest form. This is called कर्तृमुख्यविशेष्यबोधः where the action denoted by the verb qualified by all its adjuncts rests on the prinicipal concept, the subject and this the distinctive feature of their Shabdabodha.<ref name=":3">Iyer, S. R. (1979) ''Tarkabhasa of Kesava Misra, Edited with Translation, Notes, and an Introduction in English.'' Varanasi: Chaukhambha Orientalia (Pages 135-140)</ref>

According to the '''Nyaya siddhanta''' the meaning of the subjective part in the nominative case (प्रथमान्तार्थः) is the principal concept (the मुख्यविशेष्यः), to which the meanings of all other words join up directly or indirectly. However, an additional element is conveyed by the sentence as a whole over and above the concepts of the different words. There is the intended relation of the various individual concepts (पदार्थसंसर्ग), which is brought forth not by the significative force of the words, but by the syntactic juxtaposition of the various words. A sentence like चैत्रः पद्भ्यां ग्रामं गच्छति would give rise to a शाब्दबोध like पादकरणक-ग्रामकर्मक-वर्तमानकालीनगमनाभिन्न-कृतिमान् चैत्रः in its simplest form. This is called कर्तृमुख्यविशेष्यबोधः where the action denoted by the verb qualified by all its adjuncts rests on the prinicipal concept, the subject and this the distinctive feature of their Shabdabodha.<ref name=":3">Iyer, S. R. (1979) ''Tarkabhasa of Kesava Misra, Edited with Translation, Notes, and an Introduction in English.'' Varanasi: Chaukhambha Orientalia (Pages 135-140)</ref>

Vaiyakaranas do not accept the Naiyayika view of shabdabodha. They hold that in Shabdabodha the action denoted by the verb is the principal concept and the meanings of all other words including the subject are subordinate to it. This is called आख्यातमुख्यविशेष्यबोधः. The above sentence would according to them, give rise to a judgement like पादकरणक-ग्रामकर्मक-चैत्रकर्तृक- वर्तमानकालिकगमनाभिन्नकृतिः. What is to be noted is the fundamental difference between the Naiyayikas and the other schools; whether the principal concept in a verbal judgement is the subject or the predicate.<ref name=":3" />

Vaiyakaranas do not accept the Naiyayika view of shabdabodha. They hold that in Shabdabodha the action denoted by the verb is the principal concept and the meanings of all other words including the subject are subordinate to it. This is called आख्यातमुख्यविशेष्यबोधः. The above sentence would according to them, give rise to a judgement like पादकरणक-ग्रामकर्मक-चैत्रकर्तृक- वर्तमानकालिकगमनाभिन्नकृतिः. What is to be noted is the fundamental difference between the Naiyayikas and the other schools; whether the principal concept in a verbal judgement is the subject or the predicate.<ref name=":3" />

A sentence or statement by itself is not sufficient to give us any knowledge of things; mere utterance of sentence does not suffice. Nor does perception of the words of a sentence lead to any knowledge about objects; mere hearing of sentence does not suffice. Thus we summarize the aspects involved in Shabdabodha

Following account of major views about the meaning conveyed by a sentence helps one understand the importance of this concept.<ref name=":2" />

# Expression : Presence of Shabda (written or spoken forms or by gestures)

* '''Saṅsargavākyārtha''' : According to this view, words independently express the universals and they are recollected through memory by association giving rise to the unified sentence-meaning. Vakyarthajnana is an outcome of Saṅsarga (association), while words-meanings are vācyārtha and sentence-meaning is lakṣyārtha. The later is figurative meaning while the former is literal (śaktyārtha or vācyārtha)

# Reception : Perception of Shabda (visual or auditory sense-organs)

* '''Nirākankṣapadārtha-vākyārtha''' : According to this view, sentence-meaning is the word-meaning (padārtha) satisfying akanksha (expectancy) involved in the cognition of a complete sense. This theory does not consider association but the meaning of words-reposed for an individual meaning as sentence-meaning.

# Instrument : Knowledge of constituent words/padas (Padajnana)

* '''Prayojanavākyārtha''' : In this theory, the intention of the speaker involved in using the words is the sentence-meaning which is known neither by expectancy nor by inference but by purpose involved in the use of the expression. This theory assumes that words express their independent meanings by their natural power (abhidhā-śakti).

# Validation : Validity of Shabda (based on trustworthiness of the person giving the statement)

* '''Kriyā-vākyārtha''' : According to this theory, an action is sentence-meaning and is expressed by the verb.

# Recognition: Understanding the meaning of statement (it is a conditional factor)

* '''Pratibhā-vākyārtha''' : For Vaiyākaraṇas, a sentence is an inner, indivisible and a real unit of awareness in nature i.e. sphoṭa and a sentential-meaning is that it reveals non-differently, it is a flash of awareness for which Bhartrhari uses the word ‘pratibhā’ which is sentence-meaning. Thus, sphoṭa, is language as awareness and the meaning is pratibhā, a clear and a distinct flash.<ref name=":2" />

=== शब्दप्रमाणम् ॥ Shabda Pramana ===

== शब्दप्रमाणम् ॥ Shabda Pramana ==

[[ShadPramanas (षड्प्रमाणाः)|Shad Pramanas]] are the very foundation of Bharatiya Darshana shastras. Shabda Pramana is one of them. According to Nyayadarshana, 'Shabda', used in the technical sense of a sentence (that can be a means of knowledge) is defined by Gautama as that which is uttered by a trustworthy person. Shabda here literally means verbal knowledge. It is the knowledge of objects derived from the words or sentences, however not all verbal knowledge is valid. Hence, Shabda as a pramana, is defined in Nyaya as valid verbal testimony. It consists in the assertion of a trustworthy person.<ref name=":72">Chatterjee. Satischandra, (1950 Second Edition) ''The Nyaya Theory of Knowledge, A Critical Study of Some Problems of Login and Metaphysics''. Calcutta: University of Calcutta. (Pages 317 - 321)</ref>

[[ShadPramanas (षड्प्रमाणाः)|Shad Pramanas]] are the very foundation of Bharatiya Darshana shastras. Shabda Pramana is one of them. According to Nyayadarshana, 'Shabda', used in the technical sense of a sentence (that can be a means of knowledge) is defined by Gautama as that which is uttered by a trustworthy person. Shabda here literally means verbal knowledge. It is the knowledge of objects derived from the words or sentences, however not all verbal knowledge is valid. Hence, Shabda as a pramana, is defined in Nyaya as valid verbal testimony. It consists in the assertion of a trustworthy person.<ref name=":72">Chatterjee. Satischandra, (1950 Second Edition) ''The Nyaya Theory of Knowledge, A Critical Study of Some Problems of Logic and Metaphysics''. Calcutta: University of Calcutta. (Pages 317 - 321)</ref>

A trustworthy person is one who has the discerning knowledge of objects to attain what is beneficial and avoid what is harmful. Such a person may be a seer, a virtuous man, a foreigner (mleccha); and the sentence uttered by them consisting of words having syntactic expectancy (yogyata), congruity (aakanksha) and proximity (sannidi or aasatti) is a valid verbal testimony or Shabda Pramana (शब्दप्रमाणम्).<ref name=":0" />

A trustworthy person is one who has the discerning knowledge of objects to attain what is beneficial and avoid what is harmful. Such a person may be a seer, a virtuous man, a foreigner (mleccha); and the sentence uttered by them consisting of words having syntactic expectancy (yogyata), congruity (aakanksha) and proximity (sannidi or aasatti) is a valid verbal testimony or Shabda Pramana (शब्दप्रमाणम्).<ref name=":0" />

=== Summary of Darsanika Views About a Sentence ===

=== Summary of Darsanika Views About a Sentence ===

{| class="wikitable"

{| class="wikitable"

!School of thought

!School of thought

!Vakya Lakshana

!Vakya Lakshana

!Siddhantas Accepted or Rejected

!Siddhantas Accepted or Rejected

|-

|-

|Samkhya

|Samkhya

|Sentence is a group of words

|Sentence is a group of words

|Reject Sphota

|Reject Sphota

|-

|-

|Yoga

|Yoga

|Accepts the nature of a sentence similar to that of the Vaiyakaranas.  

|Accepts the nature of a sentence similar to that of the Vaiyakaranas.  

|

|

|-

|-

|Nyaya

|Nyaya

|Sentence consists of several units in the form of two or more words (Vatsyayana bhashya on Nyayasutra 2.1.54)

|Sentence consists of several units in the form of two or more words (Vatsyayana bhashya on Nyayasutra 2.1.54)

|Varnas are the ultimate constituents of a sentence

|Varnas are the ultimate constituents of a sentence

|-

|-

|Sentence is a group of words (Udayana in Nyayakusumanjali 5.6)

|Sentence is a group of words (Udayana in Nyayakusumanjali 5.6)

Words not having syntatic expectancy, etc do not constitute a sentence.

Words not having syntatic expectancy, etc do not constitute a sentence.

|Rejects Shabda as independent Pramana; Places it under Anumana Pramana

|Rejects Shabda as independent Pramana; Places it under Anumana Pramana

|-

|-

|Words which serve a unitary purpose constitute a sentence (Sabara bhashya on Mimasa Sutra 2.2.26)

|Words which serve a unitary purpose constitute a sentence (Sabara bhashya on Mimasa Sutra 2.2.26)

Sentence is a group of words conveying a single meaning (Sabara bhashya on Mimamsa Sutra 2.1.46)

Sentence is a group of words conveying a single meaning (Sabara bhashya on Mimamsa Sutra 2.1.46)

|Shabda is an independent Pramana

|Shabda is an independent Pramana

|Advaita Vedanta

|Advaita Vedanta

|Letters or words in a specific order constitute a sentence (Sankara bhashya on Vedanta Sutra 1.3.28)

|Letters or words in a specific order constitute a sentence (Sankara bhashya on Vedanta Sutra 1.3.28)

|Rejects Sphota

|Rejects Sphota

|-

|-

|Visistadvaita Vedanta

|Visistadvaita Vedanta

|Words manifested in a single cognition constitute a sentence (Vedantadesika in Tattvamuktakalapa)

|Words manifested in a single cognition constitute a sentence (Vedantadesika in Tattvamuktakalapa)

|Rejects Sphota

|Rejects Sphota

|-

|-

|Dvaita Vedanta

|Dvaita Vedanta

|Sentence is made up of words having yogyata, akanksha and aasatti (Jayatirtha in Pramanapaddhati)

|Sentence is made up of words having yogyata, akanksha and aasatti (Jayatirtha in Pramanapaddhati)

|Rejects Sphota

|Rejects Sphota

|-

|-

|Vyakarana

|Vyakarana

|Sentence has the nature of sphota; it is an utterable linguistic unit which is indivisible.

|Sentence has the nature of sphota; it is an utterable linguistic unit which is indivisible.

|

|Proponents of Sphota

|}

|}

The Naiyaayikas admit that the articulate alphabetic sounds are the ultimate constituents of a sentence. There arises the auditory perception of each and every articulate alphabetic sound when it is uttered. One construes two or more sounds in the form of a word. From the cognition of the word one arrives at the cognition of its meaning. One then construes two or more words in the form of a sentence and from the cognition of it, one gets at the cognition of the relation of the word-meanings - the relation which is the sentence-meaning. The conclusive view of the Naiyaayikas is that a word is a group of articulate alphabetic sounds and a sentence is a group of words. A group or aggregate is not distinct from the units comprising it. Even when it is said that a word consists of several articulate alphabetic sounds and a sentence consists of several words, it comes to this, that articulate alphabetical sounds manifested in a single cognition constitute a sentence.  

The Naiyaayikas admit that the articulate alphabetic sounds are the ultimate constituents of a sentence. There arises the auditory perception of each and every articulate alphabetic sound when it is uttered. One construes two or more sounds in the form of a word. From the cognition of the word one arrives at the cognition of its meaning. One then construes two or more words in the form of a sentence and from the cognition of it, one gets at the cognition of the relation of the word-meanings - the relation which is the sentence-meaning. The conclusive view of the Naiyaayikas is that a word is a group of articulate alphabetic sounds and a sentence is a group of words. A group or aggregate is not distinct from the units comprising it. Even when it is said that a word consists of several articulate alphabetic sounds and a sentence consists of several words, it comes to this, that articulate alphabetical sounds manifested in a single cognition constitute a sentence.  

== बौद्धार्थः ॥ Imaginary Things ==

== बौद्धार्थः ॥ Imagination ==

Patañjali says सतो बुद्धिविषयान् प्रकाशयन्ति (they express things that are there in the mind) which clearly supports ‘बौद्धार्थ’। बुद्धौ कृत्वा सर्वाश्चेष्टाः कर्ता धीरस्तन्वन्नीतिः’ (the scholar, who has got an intellect that spreads, would imagine all the process, i.e. related to prior and latter, the relation etc. in the intellect) etc. is the statement of Patañjali which also establishes the सिद्धान्त of बौद्धार्थ. Words like शशशृङ्गम् (a hare's horn), गगनकुसुमम् (a flower in the sky) express things that are बौद्ध (imaginary) rather than real. For such words no बाह्यार्थ (outside / real thing)  exists but due to the capacity of ''Śabda'' the cognition is generated.<ref name=":1" />

Artha (अर्थः) or Meaning is of two types - वस्तु (real) and बौद्धार्थ (imaginary). For the Vaiyakaranas, the meaning of a word is closely related to the level of understanding. Whether or not things are real, we do have concepts that form the content of a person’s cognitions derived from language. Without necessarily denying or affirming the external reality of objects in the world, grammarians claimed that the meaning of a word is only a projection of intellect (bauddhārtha, buddhipratibhāṣa).<ref name=":2" />

 

 

In निरालम्बनवाद (श्लो^० १०७-११३) of श्लोकवार्त्तिक Kumārila clearly states that अलातचक्र  ''alātacakra'' (the illusory wheel we get while rotating a firebrand at high speeds) and others such as शशशृङ्गम् is बौद्धार्थ।<ref name=":1">Paper Presentation by Prof. K. Subrahmanayam titled ''[https://groups.google.com/d/msg/bvparishat/xY1Y-wdPeSo/CKzUaFPABwAJ Pramāṇas in Indian Philosophy]''</ref><blockquote>स्वप्नादिप्रत्यये बाह्यं सर्वथा न हि नेष्यते ॥ १०७ ॥</blockquote><blockquote>सर्वत्रालम्बनं बाह्यं देशकालान्यथात्मकम् । जन्मन्येकत्र भिन्ने वा तथा कालान्तरेऽपि वा ॥ १०८ ॥</blockquote><blockquote>तद्देशो वान्यदेशो वा स्वप्नज्ञानस्य गोचरः । अलातचक्रेऽलातं स्याच्छीघ्रभ्रमणसंस्कृतम् ॥ १०९ ॥</blockquote><blockquote>गन्धर्वनगरेऽभ्राणि पूर्वदृष्टं गृहादि च । पूर्वानुभूततोयं च रश्मितप्तोषरं तथा ॥ ११० ॥</blockquote><blockquote>मृगतोयस्य विज्ञाने कारणत्वेन कल्प्यते । द्रव्यान्तरे विषाणं च शशस्यत्मा च कारणम् ॥ १११ ॥</blockquote><blockquote>शशशृङ्गधियो मौण्ड्यं निषेधे शिरसोऽस्य च । वस्त्वन्तरैरसंसृष्टः पदार्थः शून्यताधियः ॥ ११२ ॥</blockquote><blockquote>कारणत्वं पदार्थानामसद्वाक्यार्थकल्पने । अत्यन्ताननुभूतोऽपि बुद्ध्या योऽर्थः प्रकल्प्यते ॥ ११३ ॥ (Sloka. Vart. 107-113)<ref>Slokavartika of Kumarilabhatta ([https://sa.wikisource.org/wiki/%E0%A4%B6%E0%A5%8D%E0%A4%B2%E0%A5%8B%E0%A4%95%E0%A4%B5%E0%A4%BE%E0%A4%B0%E0%A5%8D%E0%A4%A4%E0%A4%BF%E0%A4%95%E0%A4%AE%E0%A5%8D Full Text])</ref></blockquote>Patañjali advocates a third category, i.e., other than प्रमा and भ्रम, called विकल्प. प्रमा is यथार्थज्ञान (authoritative cognition) achieved through ''Pramāṇas'' whereas भ्रम or विपर्यय is the usage (and the connected cognition) that is borne from the usage and the cognition that follows but without the existence of the thing in question – शब्दज्ञानानुपाती वस्तुशून्यो विकल्पः (यौ^० सू^० १-९) is the ''sūtra'' of Patañjali. शशशृङ्गम् etc. are examples. Such a cognition is possible when there is बौद्धार्थ. There is no बाह्यार्थ (outside / real thing) but due to the capacity of Śabda the cognition is generated. The same is expressed by Kumārila in श्लोकवार्त्तिकम् (चोदनासूत्रम् – ६)

Patañjali says सतो बुद्धिविषयान् प्रकाशयन्ति (they express things that are there in the mind) which clearly supports ‘बौद्धार्थ’। बुद्धौ कृत्वा सर्वाश्चेष्टाः कर्ता धीरस्तन्वन्नीतिः’ (the scholar, who has got an intellect that spreads, would imagine all the process, i.e. related to prior and latter, the relationship within the intellect) is the statement of Patañjali which also establishes the बौद्धार्थ. Words like शशशृङ्गम् (a hare's horn), गगनकुसुमम् (a flower in the sky) express things that are बौद्ध (imaginary) rather than real. For such words no बाह्यार्थ (outside / real thing) exists but due to the capacity of ''Śabda'' the cognition is generated.<ref name=":1" />

अत्यन्तासत्यपि ज्ञानमर्थे शब्दः करोति हि। (even if the real thing is absolutely absent ''Śabda'' generates the cognition). Hence अत्यन्तासत् means अत्यन्ताभाव।

In निरालम्बनवाद (श्लो^० १०७-११३) of श्लोकवार्त्तिक Kumārila clearly states that अलातचक्र  ''alātacakra'' (the illusory wheel we get while rotating a firebrand at high speeds) and others such as शशशृङ्गम् is बौद्धार्थ।<ref name=":1">Paper Presentation by Prof. K. Subrahmanayam titled ''[https://groups.google.com/d/msg/bvparishat/xY1Y-wdPeSo/CKzUaFPABwAJ Pramāṇas in Indian Philosophy]''</ref><blockquote>स्वप्नादिप्रत्यये बाह्यं सर्वथा न हि नेष्यते ॥ १०७ ॥</blockquote><blockquote>सर्वत्रालम्बनं बाह्यं देशकालान्यथात्मकम् । जन्मन्येकत्र भिन्ने वा तथा कालान्तरेऽपि वा ॥ १०८ ॥</blockquote><blockquote>तद्देशो वान्यदेशो वा स्वप्नज्ञानस्य गोचरः । अलातचक्रेऽलातं स्याच्छीघ्रभ्रमणसंस्कृतम् ॥ १०९ ॥</blockquote><blockquote>गन्धर्वनगरेऽभ्राणि पूर्वदृष्टं गृहादि च । पूर्वानुभूततोयं च रश्मितप्तोषरं तथा ॥ ११० ॥</blockquote><blockquote>मृगतोयस्य विज्ञाने कारणत्वेन कल्प्यते । द्रव्यान्तरे विषाणं च शशस्यत्मा च कारणम् ॥ १११ ॥</blockquote><blockquote>शशशृङ्गधियो मौण्ड्यं निषेधे शिरसोऽस्य च । वस्त्वन्तरैरसंसृष्टः पदार्थः शून्यताधियः ॥ ११२ ॥</blockquote><blockquote>कारणत्वं पदार्थानामसद्वाक्यार्थकल्पने । अत्यन्ताननुभूतोऽपि बुद्ध्या योऽर्थः प्रकल्प्यते ॥ ११३ ॥ (Sloka. Vart. 107-113)<ref>Slokavartika of Kumarilabhatta ([https://sa.wikisource.org/wiki/%E0%A4%B6%E0%A5%8D%E0%A4%B2%E0%A5%8B%E0%A4%95%E0%A4%B5%E0%A4%BE%E0%A4%B0%E0%A5%8D%E0%A4%A4%E0%A4%BF%E0%A4%95%E0%A4%AE%E0%A5%8D Full Text])</ref></blockquote>Patañjali advocates a third category, i.e., other than Prama (प्रमा) and Bhrama (भ्रम) called Vikalpa (विकल्प). प्रमा is यथार्थज्ञान (authoritative cognition) achieved through ''Pramāṇas.'' Bhrama ''(''भ्रम) or विपर्यय is the usage (and the connected cognition) that  follows but without the existence of the thing in question – शब्दज्ञानानुपाती वस्तुशून्यो विकल्पः (यौ^० सू^० १-९) is the ''sūtra'' of Patañjali. शशशृङ्गम् etc. are examples. Such a cognition is possible when there is बौद्धार्थ. There is no बाह्यार्थ (outside / real thing) but due to the capacity of Śabda the cognition is generated. The same is expressed by Kumārila in Slokavartikam (श्लोकवार्त्तिकम्) (चोदनासूत्रम् – ६)<ref name=":1" /><blockquote>अत्यन्तासत्यपि ज्ञानमर्थे शब्दः करोति हि। </blockquote>It means that even if the real thing is absolutely absent ''Śabda'' generates the cognition.  

== References ==

== References ==

<references />

<references />

[[Category:Darshanas]]

[[Category:Darshanas]]

[[Category:Shastras]]

[[Category:Shastras]]