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| + | Shabdabodha (Samskrit : शाब्दबोधः) refers to the awareness and information of things hitherto unknown (to the listeners) to convey which a speaker utters words generated by shabda arranged in intelligible sentences. The awareness generated by such shabda — in the form of a sentence – is called "Shabdabodha", cognition of sentence meaning or awareness of the relation (of word-meanings). Almost all schools of darshanas, vyakarana and alankara shastras have dealt with this topic extensively.<ref name=":0">Dr. N. S. Ramanuja Tatacharya. (2005) ''[https://archive.org/details/ShabdaBodhamimansaAnInquiryIntoIndianTheoriesOfVerbalCognitionN.S.RamanujaTatacharya/page/n39 Shabdabodhamimamsa. An Inquiry into Indian Theories of Verbal Cognition. Volume 1: The Sentence and its Significance.]'' New Delhi : Rastriya Sanskrit Samsthan</ref> |
− | Shabdabodha (Samskrit : शाब्दबोधः) refers to the awareness and information of things hitherto unknown (to the listeners) to convey which a speaker utters words generated by shabda arranged in intelligible sentences. The awareness generated by such shabda — in the form of a sentence – is called "Shabdabodha", cognition of sentence meaning or awareness of the relation (of word-meanings). Almost all schools of darshanas, vyakarana and alankara shastras have dealt with this topic extensively.<ref name=":0">Dr. N. S. Ramanuja Tatacharya. (2005) ''[https://archive.org/details/ShabdaBodhamimansaAnInquiryIntoIndianTheoriesOfVerbalCognitionN.S.RamanujaTatacharya/page/n39 Shabdabodhamimamsa. An Inquiry into Indian Theories of Verbal Cognition. Volume 1: The Sentence and its Significance.]'' New Delhi : Rastriya Sanskrit Samsthan</ref> | |
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| == परिचयः ॥ Introduction == | | == परिचयः ॥ Introduction == |
| The concept of Shabda is the very foundation of the Shabdapramana. Hence understanding a word and subsequent knowledge-from-word forms the basis of Shabdabodha. Shabda according to various texts broadly refer to meaningful "words (शब्दाः)", and their combination in the form of "sentences (वाक्यं)". While individual words have their meanings, the process through which the cognition of the sentence-meaning arises, involves processes such as yogyata (योग्यता । fitness) akanksha (आकाङ्क्षा । expectancy), aasatti (आसत्तिः । proximity) and tatparya (तात्पर्यम् । import). Alankarikas such as Vishvanatha have clearly defined a sentence as that group of words having yogyata, akanksha and aasatti. <blockquote>वाक्यं स्याद्योग्यताकाङ्क्षासत्तियुक्तः पदोच्चयः । (Sahi. Darp. 2.1)<ref>Sahitya Darpana by Vishvanatha ([https://sa.wikisource.org/wiki/%E0%A4%B8%E0%A4%BE%E0%A4%B9%E0%A4%BF%E0%A4%A4%E0%A5%8D%E0%A4%AF%E0%A4%A6%E0%A4%B0%E0%A5%8D%E0%A4%AA%E0%A4%A3%E0%A4%AE%E0%A5%8D/%E0%A4%A6%E0%A5%8D%E0%A4%B5%E0%A4%BF%E0%A4%A4%E0%A5%80%E0%A4%AF%E0%A4%83_%E0%A4%AA%E0%A4%B0%E0%A4 Pariccheda 2])</ref></blockquote>Bharthari says: <blockquote>अर्थप्रवृत्तितत्त्वानां शब्दा एव निबन्धनम् । तत्त्वावबोधः शब्दानां नास्ति व्याकरणादृते ।। 13 ।। (Vaky. Brah. 13)<ref>Vakyapadiyam by Bhartrhari ([https://sa.wikisource.org/wiki/%E0%A4%B5%E0%A4%BE%E0%A4%95%E0%A5%8D%E0%A4%AF%E0%A4%AA%E0%A4%A6%E0%A5%80%E0%A4%AF%E0%A4%AE%E0%A5%8D_(%E0%A4%B8%E0%A4%B5%E0%A5%83%E0%A4%A4%E0%A5%8D%E0%A4%A4%E0%A4%BF)/%E0%A4%AA%E0%A5%8D%E0%A4%B0%E0%A4%A5%E0%A4%AE%E0%A4%83_%E0 Brahmakaanda])</ref></blockquote>It is words that form the bases of meanings, purposes, activities and truth. Knowledge of Vyakarana is the only recourse to understand the truth (तत्त्वावबोधः) embedded in the shabda.<ref name=":0" /> | | The concept of Shabda is the very foundation of the Shabdapramana. Hence understanding a word and subsequent knowledge-from-word forms the basis of Shabdabodha. Shabda according to various texts broadly refer to meaningful "words (शब्दाः)", and their combination in the form of "sentences (वाक्यं)". While individual words have their meanings, the process through which the cognition of the sentence-meaning arises, involves processes such as yogyata (योग्यता । fitness) akanksha (आकाङ्क्षा । expectancy), aasatti (आसत्तिः । proximity) and tatparya (तात्पर्यम् । import). Alankarikas such as Vishvanatha have clearly defined a sentence as that group of words having yogyata, akanksha and aasatti. <blockquote>वाक्यं स्याद्योग्यताकाङ्क्षासत्तियुक्तः पदोच्चयः । (Sahi. Darp. 2.1)<ref>Sahitya Darpana by Vishvanatha ([https://sa.wikisource.org/wiki/%E0%A4%B8%E0%A4%BE%E0%A4%B9%E0%A4%BF%E0%A4%A4%E0%A5%8D%E0%A4%AF%E0%A4%A6%E0%A4%B0%E0%A5%8D%E0%A4%AA%E0%A4%A3%E0%A4%AE%E0%A5%8D/%E0%A4%A6%E0%A5%8D%E0%A4%B5%E0%A4%BF%E0%A4%A4%E0%A5%80%E0%A4%AF%E0%A4%83_%E0%A4%AA%E0%A4%B0%E0%A4 Pariccheda 2])</ref></blockquote>Bharthari says: <blockquote>अर्थप्रवृत्तितत्त्वानां शब्दा एव निबन्धनम् । तत्त्वावबोधः शब्दानां नास्ति व्याकरणादृते ।। 13 ।। (Vaky. Brah. 13)<ref>Vakyapadiyam by Bhartrhari ([https://sa.wikisource.org/wiki/%E0%A4%B5%E0%A4%BE%E0%A4%95%E0%A5%8D%E0%A4%AF%E0%A4%AA%E0%A4%A6%E0%A5%80%E0%A4%AF%E0%A4%AE%E0%A5%8D_(%E0%A4%B8%E0%A4%B5%E0%A5%83%E0%A4%A4%E0%A5%8D%E0%A4%A4%E0%A4%BF)/%E0%A4%AA%E0%A5%8D%E0%A4%B0%E0%A4%A5%E0%A4%AE%E0%A4%83_%E0 Brahmakaanda])</ref></blockquote>It is words that form the bases of meanings, purposes, activities and truth. Knowledge of Vyakarana is the only recourse to understand the truth (तत्त्वावबोधः) embedded in the shabda.<ref name=":0" /> |
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| Annambhatta in his Tarkasangraha says that a Shabda is that which has the significative relation; Vakya (वाक्यम्), a sentence, is a group of such words. | | Annambhatta in his Tarkasangraha says that a Shabda is that which has the significative relation; Vakya (वाक्यम्), a sentence, is a group of such words. |
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− | === Purva Mimamsa === | + | ==== Purva Mimamsa ==== |
| Like the Naiyāyikas, generally, Mīmāmsakas accept that the group of articulate alphabetic phonemes is a word and the group of words is a sentence. But they maintain that the articulate phonemes are eternal, while the Naiyāyikas treat them as non-eternal. Accordingly there is a subtle difference in the mode of interpretation of the varnas attaining the form of words and sentences. | | Like the Naiyāyikas, generally, Mīmāmsakas accept that the group of articulate alphabetic phonemes is a word and the group of words is a sentence. But they maintain that the articulate phonemes are eternal, while the Naiyāyikas treat them as non-eternal. Accordingly there is a subtle difference in the mode of interpretation of the varnas attaining the form of words and sentences. |
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| Kumārila too subscribes to the above view. Sālikānātha in his Prakaranapañcikā declares that according to Prabhakara a sentence is the group of words. And the sentence-meaning is the collection of word-meanings. The Mīmāmsakas do not admit a word as distinct from letters (varna-s or articulate letter- sounds) and also a sentence as distinct from words. Extensive arguments are supplicated by Shabara explaining the manner in which the letters attain the state of a word and a sentence. | | Kumārila too subscribes to the above view. Sālikānātha in his Prakaranapañcikā declares that according to Prabhakara a sentence is the group of words. And the sentence-meaning is the collection of word-meanings. The Mīmāmsakas do not admit a word as distinct from letters (varna-s or articulate letter- sounds) and also a sentence as distinct from words. Extensive arguments are supplicated by Shabara explaining the manner in which the letters attain the state of a word and a sentence. |
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− | === Samkhya Darshana === | + | ==== Samkhya Darshana ==== |
| The Sānkhya school accepts that letters which are non-eternal are denotative of the meanings. In this connection they reject the theory of sphoța accepted by the Grammarians and the theory that letters are eternal accepted by the Mīmāmsaka-s. Like the Naiyayika-s, the Sānkhya school admits that the group of letters is a word and the group of words is a sentence. | | The Sānkhya school accepts that letters which are non-eternal are denotative of the meanings. In this connection they reject the theory of sphoța accepted by the Grammarians and the theory that letters are eternal accepted by the Mīmāmsaka-s. Like the Naiyayika-s, the Sānkhya school admits that the group of letters is a word and the group of words is a sentence. |
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− | === Yoga Darshana === | + | ==== Yoga Darshana ==== |
| According to the Yoga system, we falsely superimpose an identity among a word, its object and the idea conveyed. Conditioned by conventional meaning, the letters are uttered in a particular order and they become the content of a single cognition and thus constitute a single unit, i.e. the word. The word appears to be indivisible; it does not have any reference to the sequence of letters. It is manifested by the operation of the recognition of the final letter. Thus the Yoga system accepts the nature of a sentence similar to that of the Grammarians. | | According to the Yoga system, we falsely superimpose an identity among a word, its object and the idea conveyed. Conditioned by conventional meaning, the letters are uttered in a particular order and they become the content of a single cognition and thus constitute a single unit, i.e. the word. The word appears to be indivisible; it does not have any reference to the sequence of letters. It is manifested by the operation of the recognition of the final letter. Thus the Yoga system accepts the nature of a sentence similar to that of the Grammarians. |
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| === Vyakarana Shastra === | | === Vyakarana Shastra === |
| The final conclusion of the Grammarians is that an utterable linguistic unit which is indivisible is the sentence. Bharthari in his Vākyapadīya has set forth eight views regarding the nature of a sentence; and, they are as follows: | | The final conclusion of the Grammarians is that an utterable linguistic unit which is indivisible is the sentence. Bharthari in his Vākyapadīya has set forth eight views regarding the nature of a sentence; and, they are as follows: |
− | | + | # A word having a verbal suffix at its end is a sentence.: This does not mean that only the single word with a verbal suffix is a sentence, because that would contradict the common experience of viewing a sentence as the group of words terminating in either sup or tin, as for instance, "Steer the cow with a stick, O! Devadatta". What is meant here is that sometimes even the word having a verbal suffix at its end suffices as a sentence. There are certain cases where there arises the verbal cognition from the mere use of a verb. For example the use of the word "shut" (pidhehi). Here, even without the noun expressive of the notion of a case (kāraka), there arises the cognition of the sentence-meaning, viz, shut the door. |
− | === A word having a verbal suffix at its end is a sentence. ===
| + | # A group of words is a sentence : According to this view the mere word "shut" is not a sentence. But there is the importation of the word 'door' and it is the group of these two words that must be viewed as a sentence. And just as a verb by itself does not constitute a sentence, even so a mere word having a case-ending such as 'door is not a sentence, as the activity of shutting is not invariably known by the utterance of the word 'door'.: |
− | This does not mean that only the single word with a verbal suffix is a sentence, because that would contradict the common experience of viewing a sentence as the group of words terminating in either sup or tin, as for instance, "Steer the cow with a stick, O! Devadatta". What is meant here is that sometimes even the word having a verbal suffix at its end suffices as a sentence. There are certain cases where there arises the verbal cognition from the mere use of a verb. For example the use of the word "shut" (pidhehi). Here, even without the noun expressive of the notion of a case (kāraka), there arises the cognition of the sentence-meaning, viz, shut the door. | + | # The universal, present in words is a sentence : According to this view there is a universal or generic feature in a group of words; and it is a sentence significative of the sentence meaning |
− | | + | # An indivisible word is a sentences: According to this view a sentence is one unit devoid of parts. And letters or words have no real existence therein. |
− | === A group of words is a sentence ===
| + | # The order of words is a sentence: The words in succession constitute a sentence (vākyasphota). According to this view, the latter is divisible and is generated by the group of words. |
− | According to this view the mere word "shut" is not a sentence. But there is the importation of the word 'door' and it is the group of these two words that must be viewed as a sentence. And just as a verb by itself does not constitute a sentence, even so a mere word having a case-ending such as 'door is not a sentence, as the activity of shutting is not invariably known by the utterance of the word 'door'.: | + | # The imaginary aggregate of words in the intellect is a sentence: Division of words is only a conceptual construction in our intellect according to this view. The real sentence is undivided and does not have words in it. The sentence as structured exists only in our minds. |
− | | + | # The first word is a sentence: According to this view a sentence is divisible and is generated by a group of words. And the first word in the group is the sentence. The other words of the group are helpful in identifying the significative relation of the first word to its meaning. For example, the expression sāksāt kriyate. Here the word sākṣāt conveys the meaning of perceptional knowledge. And the word kriyate is only indicative of the significative relation of the word sākṣāt to its meaning. |
− | === The universal, present in words is a sentence ===
| + | # The author of Vārttika (Kātyāyana) defines a sentence in two ways: 1) the verbal suffix qualified by avyaya and kāraka, and, 2) the one which has a single verb. These two definitions do not differ from the definition set forth earlier, viz. a sentence is a group of words. |
− | According to this view there is a universal or generic feature in a group of words; and it is a sentence significative of the sentence meaning | + | Of the eight definitions of sentence, those described under the heads 3, 4 and 6 treat a sentence as a indivisible unit; and those described under the heads 1, 5, 2, 7, 8, as a divisible one. |
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− | === An indivisible word is a sentences ===
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− | According to this view a sentence is one unit devoid of parts. And letters or words have no real existence therein. | |
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− | === The order of words is a sentence ===
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− | The words in succession constitute a sentence (vākyasphota). According to this view, the latter is divisible and is generated by the group of words. | |
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− | === The imaginary aggregate of words in the intellect is a sentence ===
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− | Division of words is only a conceptual construction in our intellect according to this view. The real sentence is undivided and does not have words in it. The sentence as structured exists only in our minds. | |
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− | === The first word is a sentence ===
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− | According to this view a sentence is divisible and is generated by a group of words. And the first word in the group is the sentence. The other words of the group are helpful in identifying the significative relation of the first word to its meaning. For example, the expression sāksāt kriyate. Here the word sākṣāt conveys the meaning of perceptional knowledge. And the word kriyate is only indicative of the significative relation of the word sākṣāt to its meaning. | |
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− | === The author of Vārttika (Kātyāyana) defines a sentence in two ways: ===
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− | 1) the verbal suffix qualified by avyaya and kāraka, and, 2) the one which has a single verb. These two definitions do not differ from the definition set forth earlier, viz. a sentence is a group of words 8.2. | |
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− | Of the eight definitions of sentence, those described under the heads 8.3; 8.4; 8.6 treat a sentence as a indivisible unit; and those described under the heads 8.1; 8.5; 8.2; 8.7; 8.8, as a divisible one. | |
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| Punyarāja in his commentary on the Vākyapadīya states that according to Bhartrhari the Grammarians view a sentence to be of the nature of sphota; it is an indivisible unit; the sentence-meaning is pratibhā and the relation between a sentence and its meaning is the superimposed identity (adhyāsa). | | Punyarāja in his commentary on the Vākyapadīya states that according to Bhartrhari the Grammarians view a sentence to be of the nature of sphota; it is an indivisible unit; the sentence-meaning is pratibhā and the relation between a sentence and its meaning is the superimposed identity (adhyāsa). |