Shabda Bodha (शाब्दबोधः)

Shabdabodha (Samskrit : शाब्दबोधः) refers to the awareness and information of things hitherto unknown (to the listeners), to convey which, a speaker utters words generated by shabda arranged in intelligible sentences. The awareness generated by such shabda — in the form of a sentence – is called "Shabdabodha", which is cognition of sentence meaning or awareness of the relation (of word-meanings). Almost all schools of darshanas, vyakarana and alankara shastras have dealt with this topic extensively.

परिचयः ॥ Introduction

The concept of Shabda is the very foundation of theories of language. They deal with the concepts pertaining to sound (including letters, words and sentences), its origin, qualities, relationship with listener and its validity as a pramana. Hence understanding a word and subsequent knowledge-from-word forms the basis of Shabdabodha. Shabda according to various texts broadly refer to meaningful "words (शब्दाः)", and their combination in the form of "sentences (वाक्यं)". While individual words have their meanings, the process through which the cognition of the sentence-meaning arises, involves processes such as yogyata (योग्यता । fitness) akanksha (आकाङ्क्षा । expectancy), aasatti (आसत्तिः । proximity) and tatparya (तात्पर्यम् । import). Alankarikas such as Vishvanatha have clearly defined a sentence as that group of words having yogyata, akanksha and aasatti.

वाक्यं स्याद्योग्यताकाङ्क्षासत्तियुक्तः पदोच्चयः । (Sahi. Darp. 2.1)

Bharthari says:

अर्थप्रवृत्तितत्त्वानां शब्दा एव निबन्धनम् । तत्त्वावबोधः शब्दानां नास्ति व्याकरणादृते ।। 13 ।। (Vaky. Brah. 13)

It is words that form the bases of meanings, purposes, activities and truth. Knowledge of Vyakarana is the only recourse to understand the truth (तत्त्वावबोधः) embedded in the shabda.

Here in the present article we engage in a small discussion about shabdas and vakyas (group of shabdas) involving the following aspects dealt according to different schools of Darshanas.

• definition of shabda
• validity and distinction of Shabda (or verbal testimony)
• nature of a vakya and vakyarthavichara (sentence-meaning)
• cause of the cognition of the vakyartha

व्युत्पत्तिः ॥ Etymology

Shabdakalpadruma defines the word शब्दः as श्रोत्रग्राह्यगुणपदार्थ-विशेषः। that padartha having the quality of being captured (heard) by the ear. The synonyms for Shabda according to Amarakosha are

१ निनादः २ निनदः ३ ध्वनिः ४ ध्वानः ५ रवः ६ स्वनः ७ स्वानः ८ निर्घोषः ९ निर्हादः १० नादः ११ निःस्वानः १२ निःस्वनः १३ आरवः १४ आरावः १५ संरावः १६ विरावः इत्यमरः।

Shabda is two-fold as word and sentence. A word is defined as that which has the meaning or signifying power (sakti). It is also defined as a unity of articulate letter-sounds having a (verbal or case-) ending.

शब्दः ॥ Shabda (Sound)

Shabda, a word similar to many others like Dharma and Jnana, is of wide import. It is defined and explained as a that "heard by the ear" or it is a "sound (ध्वनिः)" or "a cry, roar (रवः)" by Vaiyyakaranas, apart from being used as a technical term (संज्ञा) of a valid tool of knowledge (cognition) or Pramana (प्रमाणम्) by the Darshanikas.

Shabda literally means sound. In linguistics it means the words and sentences. A word is a particular kind of sound, thus a sentence is a group of sounds arranged in a certain order. According to Nyaya, sound is a physical phenomenon. It is the attribute of an intangible and all-pervading substance called Akasha (आकाशः). Vayu is its medium of transmission from one place to another and not a substratum of the quality of sound. Sound is a product of the conjunction of two bodies or of the disjunction of the parts of one composite body. It is thus non-eternal or subject to origin and cessation in time. The Mimamsakaras here differ from the Nyaya stance in that they hold that Sound is eternal, since it is not produced but only manifested by the contact of two bodies.

Sound is of two kinds, namely, Dhvani (ध्वनिः) and Varna (वर्णम्).

शब्दो ध्वनिश्च वर्णश्च मृदङ्गादिभवो ध्वनि:।।164।।

कण्ठसंयोगादिजन्या वर्णास्ते कादयो मता: सर्व: शब्दो नभोवृत्ति: श्रोत्रोत्पन्नस्तु गृह्यते।।165।। (Nyayasiddhanta Muktavali 164-165)

ध्वनिः ॥ Dhvani

A dhvani is an inarticulate sound, e.g. the sound of a bell or a drum. It has no fixed nature of its own, nor any fixed relation to other similar sounds. This Dhvani is thus incapable of forming parts of a language. From a linguistic standpoint, the cries of birds, and beasts and even newborn babies are considered inarticulate. They are as variable and disorderly as sounds produced by physical things and do not lend themselves to any use as alphabet of a language.

वर्णम् ॥ Varna

A varna is an articulate sound produced by the action of the vocal organ of humans, e.g. the alphabet a letter. A varna is a letter or syllable which has a fixed character and a definite place in the alphabet of any language. All varnas or letters are constituents of human speech but they independently do not have a specific meaning. These varnas are either spoken or written. Spoken letters are perceived by auditory sensation and written letters by visual sensation.

पदम् ॥ Padam (Word)

According to Tarkabhasha by Shri Keshav Mishra, a padam (word) is defined as पदं च वर्णसमूहः । Padam (word) is a collection of varnas (letters). Gangesa also in his Tattvachintamani considers the group of words to be a sentence as in वर्णसमूहः पदं ।.

A word is a group of varnas or letters arranged in a certain fixed order giving a certain meaning. The order of the letters in a word cannot be changed or reversed in any way without altering its meaning. While a letter is a significant sound, a word is a symbolic sound of a higher order. A varna signifies only a part of the alphabet but the fixed set of varnas in a padam stand for some thing or some idea. Padas are similar to varnas in their ability to be spoken or written and thus are the objects of auditory or visual perception. It should be noted that while varnas are part of alphabet and independent, a word is not a mere collection or aggregation of varnas but a definite whole of letters or syllables having a fixed sequence of arrangement within the Padam. It is the unity of the parts (syllables) forming an object (word) of single cognition.

Qualities of Words

1. It consists of varnas in a fixed order
2. its essential nature lies in its meaning
3. Meaning of the word and object it signifies have a relationship
4. Different relationships (of word and object) gives different meanings of a particular word.

Kinds of Meanings of Words

Logically a word is a sound that bears a certain meaning. A word may have different meanings according to the various ways in which it is related to the object. On the whole we see at least four different kinds of meaning of a word as per Naiyyayikas and Alamkarikas. The relation between a word and its meaning may be either Sanketa, Lakshana or Vyanjana; Sanketa is the direct relation between a word and its meaning, such that the knowledge of the word leads immediately to the knowledge of its relation to the meaning. Lakshana is the indirect or implied meaning in which we should understand a word when its direct or primary meaning is inconsistent with other words or the context. Thus such a Lakshana word means an object when it is directly related to some other aspect of the object other than its primary meaning. Naiyyayikas admit only Sanketa and Lakshana kinds of meanings. The Alamkarikas consider another kind of meaning namely Vyanjana. This stands for such meanings of words which are neither directly or indirectly related to them, but are only suggested by them.

Abhidhaa : Primary meaning

Paribhaasha : Technical meaning

Lakshana : Secondary meaning

Vyanjana : Suggested meaning

शब्दप्रमाणम् ॥ Shabda Pramana

Shabda', in the technical sense of a sentence (that can be a means of knowledge) is defined by Gautama as that which is uttered by a trustworthy person. A trustworthy person is one who has the discerning knowledge of objects to attain what is beneficial and avoid what is harmful. Such a person may be a seer, a virtuous man, a foreigner (mleccha); and the sentence uttered by them consisting of words having syntactic expectancy (yogyata), congruity (aakanksha) and proximity (sannidi or aasatti) is a valid verbal testimony or shabdapramana.

Simply put technically Shabda Pramana is आप्तोपदेशः शब्दः।।७।। āptopadeśaḥ śabdaḥ, the Shabda are the utterances of a trustworthy persons (such as Rshis, Mantradrastas). Naagesha in his Laghumanjusha further explains that an Apta (आप्तः) is one who will not utter falsehood. This expression is explained in two ways, in order to accomodate both testimony without any speaker (Apaurusheya) as well as that which is spoken by a person:

1. Upadesha (उपदेशः) that is Apta (आप्तः): A verbal testimony, an instruction that is beneficial, as in the Vedas which contain instructions that are beneficial to everyone here and hereafter. This also imbibes the concept of Apaurusheyatvam (without any speaker)
2. Upadesha (उपदेशः) by an Apta (आप्तः): A verbal testimony, a statement uttered by a trustworthy person.

Shabdabodha is extensively dealt with in establishing Pramanas by the Darshanikas (different schools of thought). Shabda Pramana is the primary basis for a seeker of Alaukika (that which is beyond the world/direct perception) knowledge and thus Shruti (Vedas) is considered as the direct valid means of knowledge. It is well known that the subject of Vedas is, that knowledge which is, beyond the grasp of physical senses and just like how a chemistry student, not having witnessed a scientist's experiments' with his eyes, accepts the words of scientist as "True"; a seeker of deep tatvasiddhanta studies (Paravidya), not having witnessed the source of this knowledge, accepts the words of a Mantradrashta or Rshi as "Truth" because they are trustworthy.

All pramanas in astika darshanas discuss about shabda pramana in one form or other and primarily differ in this point from the nastika darshanas. The nastika darshanas such as Charvakas do not admit the validity of Shabda Pramana itself, some like Buddhist schools admit it as Anumana Pramana. Naiyyayikas considered it as a distinct independent pramana and Vaiseshikas do not admit Shabda as an independent pramana, they classify it under Anumana pramana (inference).

The Charvaka school considers Pratyaksha (प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणम्) or Perception alone as and does not admit either Shabda (Verbal Testimony) or Anumana (Inference) as valid sources of knowledge.

Summarizing the above points, the constituents of Shabdapramana are as follows

1. the word or utterances (articulate letter sounds) having a meaning or signifying power (shakti)
2. the sentences (articulated word sounds) having syntactic expectancy (yogyata), congruity (akanksha) and proximity (sannidhi)
3. these words are uttered by a trustworthy person (Mantradrashtas or seers)
4. are heard by the sense of hearing or perceived through gestures (as discussed in Nrsimhaprakasika commentary given on Tarkasangrahadipika the verbal cognition arises even in absence of a sentence from the gestures shown by one who observes the vow of silence).
5. comprehended through understanding the relation among the meanings of words or sentence-meaning
6. gives rise to the knowledge (purport) of objects about which the words are uttered.

शब्दलक्षणम् ॥ Shabda Lakshana - Nyaya Darshana

Gautama in his Nyāyasūtra defines sabda or verbal testimony as

आप्तोपदेशः शब्दः।।७।। āptopadeśaḥ śabdaḥ (Nyay. Sutr. 1.1.7)

The communication/assertion made by a reliable person is Shabda (word).

आप्तः खलु साक्षात्कृतधर्मा ।... (Vats. Bhas. of Nyay. Sutr. 1.1.7)

That person is called 'Apta', 'reliable' who possesses the direct (साक्षात्) and right knowledge of things (Page 30 of Reference). The word upadeśa etymologically means "that" through which something is communicated. And "that" is the sentence that gives rise to the cognition of something unknown hitherto. In discussion about the connection between the word and the object signified by it, just as in inference there is a certain connection between the mark (smoke) and the thing signified by it (fire) the purvapaksha lays down that shabdapramana and Anumana pramana are not any different. However, the uttarapaksha clarifies the differences therein.

आप्तोपदेशसामर्थ्यात्शब्दातर्थसम्प्रत्ययः ।। ५३ ।। {सिद्धान्तसूत्र}

पूरणप्रदाहपाटनानुपलब्धेः च सम्बन्धाभावः ।। ५४ ।। {सिद्धान्तसूत्र} (Nyay. Sutr. 2.1.53-54)

Summary : The connection between the word and object signified by it is not a natural one. While acknowledging that a word indicates a certain object, the object is not necessarily or naturally connected with the word. Hearing, for instance, the, word "cow," we think of the animal signified by it, nevertheless the word and the animal are not connected with each other by nature or necessity. However, in case of inference the sign (smoke) and the thing signified by it (eg. fire) is natural and necessary and the basis for it is obvious to perception. In the case of verbal testimony, we rely on the unseen matter such as, celestial beings, saptadvipas, apsarasas etc signified by a word, because the word has been used by a reliable person. We accept them as realities not because they are known through words but because they are spoken of by persons who are reliable. Hence it is significant to note that Anumana is not based on Aptopadesha and is based on perception whereas in Shabdapramana the special point is to decide whether the sign (word) comes from a reliable person.

Vātsyāyana in his commentary on the Nyāyasūtra 2.1.54 states that a sentence consists of several units in the form of two or more words. Thus shabda or verbal testimony is that which gives rise to the valid cognition of the sentence-meaning. And it is of the nature of a sentence consisting of a group of words.

The Naiyaayikas admit that the articulate alphabetic sounds are the ultimate constituents of a sentence. There arises the auditory perception of each and every articulate alphabetic sound when it is uttered. One construes two or more sounds in the form of a word. From the cognition of the word one arrives at the cognition of its meaning. One then construes two or more words in the form of a sentence and from the cognition of it, one gets at the cognition of the relation of the word-meanings - the relation which is the sentence-meaning. The conclusive view of the Naiyaayikas is that a word is a group of articulate alphabetic sounds and a sentence is a group of words. A group or aggregate is not distinct from the units comprising it. Even when it is said that a word consists of several articulate alphabetic sounds and a sentence consists of several words, it comes to this, that articulate alphabetical sounds manifested in a single cognition constitute a sentence. It must now be inquired as to how the articulate alphabetical sounds could be viewed as word or sentence.

वाक्यलक्षणम् ॥ Vakya Lakshana

Annambhatta in his Tarkasangraha says that a Shabda is that which has the significative relation; Vakya (वाक्यम्), a sentence, is a group of such words.

Purva Mimamsa

Like the Naiyāyikas, generally, Mīmāmsakas accept that the group of articulate alphabetic phonemes is a word and the group of words is a sentence. But they maintain that the articulate phonemes are eternal, while the Naiyāyikas treat them as non-eternal. Accordingly there is a subtle difference in the mode of interpretation of the varnas attaining the form of words and sentences.

Sabara in his commentary on Jaimini Sutra says and affirms the view that such a group of words are each one dependent upon the other word for its meaning. Each word having syntactic expectancy with the other word constitutes an important aspect of a sentence.

अर्थैकत्वादेकं वाक्यं साकाङ्क्षं चेद्धिभागे स्यात्।।46।। (Jaim. Sutr. 2.1.46)

अतुल्यत्वात्तु वाक्योयोर्गुणं तस्य प्रतीयेत।।26।। (Jaim. Sutr. 2.2.26)

Again in his commentary on the above sutras Shabara mentions

अर्थैकत्वादेकं वाक्यमिति। एतस्माच्चेत् कारणादेकवाक्यता भवति तस्मादेकार्थः पदसमूहो वाक्यम्। (Bhas. Jaim. Sutr. 2.1.46)

यावन्ति पदान्येकं प्रयोजनमभिनिवर्त्तयन्ति, तावन्त्येकं वाक्यम्। (Bhas. Jaim. Sutr. 2.2.26)

Summary: Shabara states that the words which will serve a unitary purpose constitute one sentence. He states that the group of words conveying a single meaning is the sentence. From this it is clear that according to Sabara a sentence is a group of words.

Kumārila too subscribes to the above view. Sālikānātha in his Prakaranapañcikā declares that according to Prabhakara a sentence is the group of words. And the sentence-meaning is the collection of word-meanings. The Mīmāmsakas do not admit a word as distinct from letters (varna-s or articulate letter- sounds) and also a sentence as distinct from words. Extensive arguments are supplicated by Shabara explaining the manner in which the letters attain the state of a word and a sentence.

Samkhya Darshana

The Sānkhya school accepts that letters which are non-eternal are denotative of the meanings. In this connection they reject the theory of sphoța accepted by the Grammarians and the theory that letters are eternal accepted by the Mīmāmsaka-s. Like the Naiyayika-s, the Sānkhya school admits that the group of letters is a word and the group of words is a sentence.

Yoga Darshana

According to the Yoga system, we falsely superimpose an identity among a word, its object and the idea conveyed. Conditioned by conventional meaning, the letters are uttered in a particular order and they become the content of a single cognition and thus constitute a single unit, i.e. the word. The word appears to be indivisible; it does not have any reference to the sequence of letters. It is manifested by the operation of the recognition of the final letter. Thus the Yoga system accepts the nature of a sentence similar to that of the Grammarians.

Vedanta Darshana

Advaitavedanta

The Advaitins and others reject the doctrine of sphota (speechbuds or language potentials) and admit that the letters which are the objects of recollection that results from the latent impressions born out of the cognition of each letter is the word or the sentence. Prakāśātman in his Šābdanirnaya states so. Sankara in his commentary on the Vedāntasūtra 1.3.28 states:

Although all the letters in a word are cognised, still like the ants thanks to their sequential configuration generate in us the idea of a line in a definite order, the letters generate in us the notion of a word thanks to their definite sequence.

From this it is known that it is only letters in a specific order that constitute a word. And the letters or words in a due order constitute a sentence.

Visishitadvaita

The Visistādvaitin-s too accept that the letters manifested in a single cognition constitute a word and the words manifested in a single cognition constitute a sentence. Vedāntadeśika in his Tattvamuktākalāpa and in his commentary Sarvārthasiddhi thereon sets forth this view.

Dvaita

The Dvaitin-s too subscribe to the view that letters constitute a word and the words constitute a sentence. Vyāsatīrtha in his Tarkatāndava states that Jayatīrtha in his Pramānapaddhati has defined a word as letters having a termination of inflectional ending of a case or of the person of a tense or mood at their end, and a sentence as words having syntactic expectancy, congruity and proximity.

Vyakarana Shastra

The final conclusion of the Grammarians is that an utterable linguistic unit which is indivisible is the sentence. Bharthari in his Vākyapadīya has set forth eight views regarding the nature of a sentence; and, they are as follows:

1. A word having a verbal suffix at its end is a sentence.: This does not mean that only the single word with a verbal suffix is a sentence, because that would contradict the common experience of viewing a sentence as the group of words terminating in either sup or tin, as for instance, "Steer the cow with a stick, O! Devadatta". What is meant here is that sometimes even the word having a verbal suffix at its end suffices as a sentence. There are certain cases where there arises the verbal cognition from the mere use of a verb. For example the use of the word "shut" (pidhehi). Here, even without the noun expressive of the notion of a case (kāraka), there arises the cognition of the sentence-meaning, viz, shut the door.
2. A group of words is a sentence : According to this view the mere word "shut" is not a sentence. But there is the importation of the word 'door' and it is the group of these two words that must be viewed as a sentence. And just as a verb by itself does not constitute a sentence, even so a mere word having a case-ending such as 'door is not a sentence, as the activity of shutting is not invariably known by the utterance of the word 'door'.:
3. The universal, present in words is a sentence : According to this view there is a universal or generic feature in a group of words; and it is a sentence significative of the sentence meaning
4. An indivisible word is a sentences: According to this view a sentence is one unit devoid of parts. And letters or words have no real existence therein.
5. The order of words is a sentence: The words in succession constitute a sentence (vākyasphota). According to this view, the latter is divisible and is generated by the group of words.
6. The imaginary aggregate of words in the intellect is a sentence: Division of words is only a conceptual construction in our intellect according to this view. The real sentence is undivided and does not have words in it. The sentence as structured exists only in our minds.
7. The first word is a sentence: According to this view a sentence is divisible and is generated by a group of words. And the first word in the group is the sentence. The other words of the group are helpful in identifying the significative relation of the first word to its meaning. For example, the expression sāksāt kriyate. Here the word sākṣāt conveys the meaning of perceptional knowledge. And the word kriyate is only indicative of the significative relation of the word sākṣāt to its meaning.
8. The author of Vārttika (Kātyāyana) defines a sentence in two ways: 1) the verbal suffix qualified by avyaya and kāraka, and, 2) the one which has a single verb. These two definitions do not differ from the definition set forth earlier, viz. a sentence is a group of words.

Of the eight definitions of sentence, those described under the heads 3, 4 and 6 treat a sentence as a indivisible unit; and those described under the heads 1, 5, 2, 7, 8, as a divisible one.

Punyarāja in his commentary on the Vākyapadīya states that according to Bhartrhari the Grammarians view a sentence to be of the nature of sphota; it is an indivisible unit; the sentence-meaning is pratibhā and the relation between a sentence and its meaning is the superimposed identity (adhyāsa).

Patanjali Mahabhasya

In निरालम्बनवाद (श्लो^० १०७-११३) of श्लोकवार्त्तिक Kumārila clearly states that अलातचक्र etc. is बौद्धार्थ –

स्वप्नादिप्रत्यये बाह्यं सर्वथा न हि नेष्यते ॥ १०७ ॥

सर्वत्रालम्बनं बाह्यं देशकालान्यथात्मकम् । जन्मन्येकत्र भिन्ने वा तथा कालान्तरेऽपि वा ॥ १०८ ॥

तद्देशो वान्यदेशो वा स्वप्नज्ञानस्य गोचरः । अलातचक्रेऽलातं स्याच्छीघ्रभ्रमणसंस्कृतम् ॥ १०९ ॥

गन्धर्वनगरेऽभ्राणि पूर्वदृष्टं गृहादि च । पूर्वानुभूततोयं च रश्मितप्तोषरं तथा ॥ ११० ॥

मृगतोयस्य विज्ञाने कारणत्वेन कल्प्यते । द्रव्यान्तरे विषाणं च शशस्यत्मा च कारणम् ॥ १११ ॥

शशशृङ्गधियो मौण्ड्यं निषेधे शिरसोऽस्य च । वस्त्वन्तरैरसंसृष्टः पदार्थः शून्यताधियः ॥ ११२ ॥

कारणत्वं पदार्थानामसद्वाक्यार्थकल्पने । अत्यन्ताननुभूतोऽपि बुद्ध्या योऽर्थः प्रकल्प्यते ॥ ११३ ॥

Slokavartika in Wikisource

Patañjali says सतो बुद्धिविषयान् प्रकाशयन्ति (they express things that are there in the mind) which clearly supports ‘बौद्धार्थ’. ‘बुद्धौ कृत्वा सर्वाश्चेष्टाः कर्ता धीरस्तन्वन्नीतिः’ (the scholar, who has got an intellect that spreads, would imagine all the process, i.e. related to prior and latter, the relation etc. in the intellect) etc. is the statement of Patañjali which also establishes the सिद्धान्त of बौद्धार्थ. Words like शशशृङ्गम्, गगनकुसुमम् etc. express things that are बौद्ध (imaginary) rather than real.

Patañjali advocates a third category, i.e., other than प्रमा and भ्रम, called विकल्प. प्रमा is यथार्थज्ञान (authoritative cognition) achieved through Pramāṇas whereas भ्रम or विपर्यय is the usage (and the connected cognition) that is borne from the usage and the cognition that follows but without the existence of the thing in question – शब्दज्ञानानुपाती वस्तुशून्यो विकल्पः (यौ^० सू^० १-९) is the sūtra of Patañjali. शशशृङ्गम् etc. are examples. Such a cognition is possible when there is बौद्धार्थ. There is no बाह्यार्थ (outside / real thing) but due to the capacity of Śabda the cognition is generated. The same is expressed by Kumārila in श्लोकवार्त्तिकम् (चोदनासूत्रम् – ६)

अत्यन्तासत्यपि ज्ञानमर्थे शब्दः करोति हि। (even if the real thing is absolutely absent Śabda generates the cognition). Hence अत्यन्तासत् means अत्यन्ताभाव।