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Annambhatta in his Tarkasangraha explains, Yatartha jnana is Prama. He clearly defines the difference between Prama and Aprama as follows<blockquote>॥ तद्वति तत्प्रकारकोऽनुभवो यथार्थः। यथा रजते इदं रजतमिति ज्ञानम्। सैव प्रमेच्युते ॥१९॥॥ (Tark. Samg. 3.19)<ref name=":2">Tarkasamgraha ([https://sa.wikisource.org/wiki/%E0%A4%A4%E0%A4%B0%E0%A5%8D%E0%A4%95%E0%A4%B8%E0%A4%99%E0%A5%8D%E0%A4%97%E0%A5%8D%E0%A4%B0%E0%A4%B9%E0%A4%83/%E0%A4%97%E0%A5%81%E0%A4%A3%E0%A4%B2%E0%A4%95%E0%A5%8D%E0%A4%B7%E0%A4%A3%E0%A4%AA%E0%A5%8D%E0%A4%B0%E0%A4%95%E0%A4%B0%E0%A4%A3%E0%A4%AE%E0%A5%8D Gunalakshana Prakarana])</ref></blockquote>Summary : Thus Prama is that which pertains to यथार्थानुभवः। definite knowledge of an object which is true presentational in character, just as the knowledge an object of silver as "this is silver". Here the knowledge about the quality of silverness (रजतत्वम्) of the object is ''in toto'' without any distortion to silver.
 
Annambhatta in his Tarkasangraha explains, Yatartha jnana is Prama. He clearly defines the difference between Prama and Aprama as follows<blockquote>॥ तद्वति तत्प्रकारकोऽनुभवो यथार्थः। यथा रजते इदं रजतमिति ज्ञानम्। सैव प्रमेच्युते ॥१९॥॥ (Tark. Samg. 3.19)<ref name=":2">Tarkasamgraha ([https://sa.wikisource.org/wiki/%E0%A4%A4%E0%A4%B0%E0%A5%8D%E0%A4%95%E0%A4%B8%E0%A4%99%E0%A5%8D%E0%A4%97%E0%A5%8D%E0%A4%B0%E0%A4%B9%E0%A4%83/%E0%A4%97%E0%A5%81%E0%A4%A3%E0%A4%B2%E0%A4%95%E0%A5%8D%E0%A4%B7%E0%A4%A3%E0%A4%AA%E0%A5%8D%E0%A4%B0%E0%A4%95%E0%A4%B0%E0%A4%A3%E0%A4%AE%E0%A5%8D Gunalakshana Prakarana])</ref></blockquote>Summary : Thus Prama is that which pertains to यथार्थानुभवः। definite knowledge of an object which is true presentational in character, just as the knowledge an object of silver as "this is silver". Here the knowledge about the quality of silverness (रजतत्वम्) of the object is ''in toto'' without any distortion to silver.
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But knowledge is invalid (अयथार्थ । ayatartha) when a character not possessed by the object of cognition is attributed to that object and is called Aprama.<ref name=":3">Harh, Amal Kumar. (1994) Ph. D Thesis Title : The Means of knowing a negative fact a critical study on the theory of Anupalabdhi in Indian philosophy. [http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/137453/7/07_chapter_02.pdf (Chapter 2)] University of North Bengal</ref><blockquote>तदभाववति तत्प्रकारकोऽनुभवोऽयथार्थः। यथा शुक्ताविदं रजतमिति। सैव अप्रमा इत्युच्यते॥२०॥ (Tark. Samg. 3.20)<ref name=":2" /></blockquote>Summary : When a piece of shell is called "this is silver", then the cognition is invalid. For in this case "silverness" is a quality which does not belong to the shell but is being attributed to it is called [[Aprama (अप्रमा)|Aprama]].<ref name=":3" />
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But knowledge is invalid (अयथार्थः । ayatartha) when a character not possessed by the object of cognition is attributed to that object and is called Aprama.<ref name=":3">Harh, Amal Kumar. (1994) Ph. D Thesis Title : The Means of knowing a negative fact a critical study on the theory of Anupalabdhi in Indian philosophy. [http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/137453/7/07_chapter_02.pdf (Chapter 2)] University of North Bengal</ref><blockquote>तदभाववति तत्प्रकारकोऽनुभवोऽयथार्थः। यथा शुक्ताविदं रजतमिति। सैव अप्रमा इत्युच्यते॥२०॥ (Tark. Samg. 3.20)<ref name=":2" /></blockquote>Summary : When a piece of shell is called "this is silver", then the cognition is invalid. For in this case "silverness" is a quality which does not belong to the shell but is being attributed to it is called [[Aprama (अप्रमा)|Aprama]].<ref name=":3" />
    
Thus Prama has two aspects  
 
Thus Prama has two aspects  
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* Advaitins hold that Prama consists of knowledge which is undeniable (Abadhita).  
 
* Advaitins hold that Prama consists of knowledge which is undeniable (Abadhita).  
 
{| class="wikitable"
 
{| class="wikitable"
|+Difference between Prama and Jnana <ref name=":3" />
+
|+Difference between Prama and Jnana  
 
!Darshana
 
!Darshana
 
!Prama
 
!Prama
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|Nyaya  
 
|Nyaya  
 
|Definite knowledge of an object which is true presentational in character (यथार्थानुभवः)
 
|Definite knowledge of an object which is true presentational in character (यथार्थानुभवः)
|Theory of Paraprakasatva. Jnana is cognized only through another piece of cognition called as anuvyavasaya (apperception)<ref name=":4" />
+
|'''Theory of Paraprakasatva.''' Jnana is cognized only through another piece of cognition called as anuvyavasaya (apperception)<ref name=":4" />
 
|-
 
|-
 
|Vaiseshika
 
|Vaiseshika
 
|Certainity (lack of doubt) non-contradictoriness and definiteness and includes Smrti.
 
|Certainity (lack of doubt) non-contradictoriness and definiteness and includes Smrti.
|Theory of Paraprakasatva.
+
|'''Theory of Paraprakasatva.''' Like the Nyaya Vaiseshika also believes that Jnana is not self luminous.
 
|-
 
|-
 
|Advaita Vedanta  
 
|Advaita Vedanta  
 
|Truth or valid cognition is an uncontradicted knowledge
 
|Truth or valid cognition is an uncontradicted knowledge
|'''Theory of Svaprakasatva.''' Means both Absolute (Svarupa Jnana or Knowledge of Brahman) and Relative Knowledge (Vrtti Jnana Avidya or Maya) illuminated by the principle consciousness itself.  
+
|'''Theory of Svaprakasatva.''' Means both Absolute (Svarupa Jnana or Knowledge of Brahman) and Relative Knowledge (Vrtti Jnana Avidya or Maya) illuminated by the principle consciousness itself.<ref name=":3" />
 
|-
 
|-
 
|Vishishtadvaita of Uttara Mimamsa
 
|Vishishtadvaita of Uttara Mimamsa
 
|Apprehends an object as it really exists and prompts fruitful activity
 
|Apprehends an object as it really exists and prompts fruitful activity
|'''Theory of Svaprakasatva.'''  Reveals an object to its subject by virtue of its intrinsic capacity
+
|'''Theory of Svaprakasatva.'''  Reveals an object to its subject by virtue of its intrinsic capacity.<ref name=":3" />
 
|-
 
|-
 
|Prabhakara Mimamsa
 
|Prabhakara Mimamsa
 
|Similar to Nyaya but uses Anubhuti
 
|Similar to Nyaya but uses Anubhuti
|'''Theory of Svaprakasatva.''' Jnana is svaprakasa or self luminous, cognizes the three factors simultaneously - 1. it the object 2. itself 3. the Knower (Self). (Triputi-samvit)<ref name=":4" />
+
|'''Theory of Svaprakasatva.''' Jnana is svaprakasa or self luminous, cognizes the three factors simultaneously - 1. the object 2. itself 3. the Knower (Self). (Triputi-samvit)<ref name=":4" />
 
|-
 
|-
 
|Bhatta Mimamsa
 
|Bhatta Mimamsa
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==== मनः ॥ Manas ====
 
==== मनः ॥ Manas ====
<blockquote>युगपत्ज्ञानानुत्पत्तिः मनसः लिङ्गम् ।।१६।। {मनोलक्षणम्}</blockquote>Meaning : The non-appearance of simultaneous experience of all the senses is indicative of presence of Manas. <blockquote>सर्वार्थोपलब्धौ नेन्द्रियाणि प्रभवन्तीति सर्वविषयमन्तःकरणं मनः । </blockquote>
+
<blockquote>युगपत्ज्ञानानुत्पत्तिः मनसः लिङ्गम्।।१६।।{मनोलक्षणम्}</blockquote>Meaning : The non-appearance of simultaneous experience of all the senses is indicative of presence of Manas. <blockquote>सर्वार्थोपलब्धौ नेन्द्रियाणि प्रभवन्तीति सर्वविषयमन्तःकरणं मनः । </blockquote>
    
==== प्रवृत्तिः ॥ Action ====
 
==== प्रवृत्तिः ॥ Action ====
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==== Pramana and Pramanabhasa ====
 
==== Pramana and Pramanabhasa ====
The means of knowledge have reference to an object. Pramiina produces valid knowledge, the object of which exists in the actual world, whereas, Pramanabhasa produces only illusory knowledge.<ref name=":1" />
+
The means of knowledge have reference to an object. Pramana produces valid knowledge, the object of which exists in the actual world, whereas, Pramanabhasa produces only illusory knowledge.<ref name=":1" />
    
===  प्रमाता ॥ Pramata ===
 
===  प्रमाता ॥ Pramata ===
 +
Pramata
    
== References ==
 
== References ==

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