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'''Khyātivāda''' (Samskrit: ख्यातिवादाः) is the term used to refer to the Indian Theories of Perceptual Error – ''khyāti'' (ख्यातिः) besides referring to 'fame', 'renoun' etc., in [[Samkhya Darshana (साङ्ख्यदर्शनम्)|Samkhya philosophy]] refers to the 'erroneous conception' (of the Atman) or 'false apprehension', and ''vāda'' means - 'proposition', 'discourse', 'argument'. These are all theories that deal with the nature of the object of illusory perception and not with the nature of the subject, whether the error consists in the object or in the subject’s cognition. There are five principal theories dealing with perceptual errors, which are:-
 
'''Khyātivāda''' (Samskrit: ख्यातिवादाः) is the term used to refer to the Indian Theories of Perceptual Error – ''khyāti'' (ख्यातिः) besides referring to 'fame', 'renoun' etc., in [[Samkhya Darshana (साङ्ख्यदर्शनम्)|Samkhya philosophy]] refers to the 'erroneous conception' (of the Atman) or 'false apprehension', and ''vāda'' means - 'proposition', 'discourse', 'argument'. These are all theories that deal with the nature of the object of illusory perception and not with the nature of the subject, whether the error consists in the object or in the subject’s cognition. There are five principal theories dealing with perceptual errors, which are:-
 
*1) ''Asat-khyātivāda'' (apprehension of the non-existent) ([[Cārvāka]]) – what is being perceived (illusory) is really non-existent, the error consists in the apprehension of the unreal or in the perception of non-existent entities.
 
*1) ''Asat-khyātivāda'' (apprehension of the non-existent) ([[Cārvāka]]) – what is being perceived (illusory) is really non-existent, the error consists in the apprehension of the unreal or in the perception of non-existent entities.
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*5) ''Anirvacanīya-khyātivāda'' (apprehension of the indescribable) ([[Advaita]]) – the object is neither existent (सत्) nor non-existent (असत्) but indescribable (अनिर्वचनियम्), the illusory object is a product of ignorance (''avidyā'') about the substratum and the error is caused due to ''[[Maya (illusion)|Maya]]'' which is also indescribable.
 
*5) ''Anirvacanīya-khyātivāda'' (apprehension of the indescribable) ([[Advaita]]) – the object is neither existent (सत्) nor non-existent (असत्) but indescribable (अनिर्वचनियम्), the illusory object is a product of ignorance (''avidyā'') about the substratum and the error is caused due to ''[[Maya (illusion)|Maya]]'' which is also indescribable.
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An understanding of what is true and what is untrue is an integral part of philosophical study for acquisition of highest knowledge. Knowledge presupposes a subject of that knowledge and also the object corresponding to it. The nature of knowledge however depends upon the mind and the cognitive faculties of the subject as also on the conditions in which the object is situated in relation to the subject; an error is caused due to a peculiar relation formed by the perceiver and the position of the object. Inference, a valid mode of cognition, is based on previous perception, and an erroneous perception negates the value of perception.<ref>{{cite book|title=Classical Indian Philosophy|author=J.Mohanty|publisher=Rowman & Littlefield|pages=33–34|url=https://books.google.co.in/books?id=asxruhA1DRgC&pg=PA32&dq=khyativada&hl=en&sa=X&ei=9TLCVLb-NcXbmgWnyYDAAQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=khyativada&f=false }}</ref><ref>{{cite web|title=Theories about erroneous cognition|author=S.N.Sastri|url=http://www.ambaa.org/pdf/khyativada_sns_engsans.pdf}}</ref> The first three of the afore-listed five theories admit that the object perceived illusorily is, in one way or the other, existent; the remaining two, do not accept this contention.<ref>{{cite book|title=The Contribution of Anandabodha to Advaita|author=E.I.Warrier|publisher=Mittal Publications|page=77|url= https://books.google.co.in/books?id=ik9SLY9KrkcC&pg=PA77&dq=khyativada&hl=en&sa=X&ei=9TLCVLb-NcXbmgWnyYDAAQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=khyativada&f=false }}</ref>
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An understanding of what is true and what is untrue is an integral part of philosophical study for acquisition of highest knowledge. Knowledge presupposes a subject of that knowledge and also the object corresponding to it. The nature of knowledge however depends upon the mind and the cognitive faculties of the subject as also on the conditions in which the object is situated in relation to the subject; an error is caused due to a peculiar relation formed by the perceiver and the position of the object. Inference, a valid mode of cognition, is based on previous perception, and an erroneous perception negates the value of perception.<ref>{{cite book|title=Classical Indian Philosophy|author=J.Mohanty|publisher=Rowman & Littlefield|pages=33–34|url=https://books.google.co.in/books?id=asxruhA1DRgC&pg=PA32&dq=khyativada&hl=en&sa=X&ei=9TLCVLb-NcXbmgWnyYDAAQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=khyativada&f=false }}</ref><ref>{{cite web|title=Theories about erroneous cognition|author=S.N.Sastri|url=http://www.ambaa.org/pdf/khyativada_sns_engsans.pdf}}</ref> The first three of the afore-listed five theories admit that the object perceived illusorily is, in one way or the other, existent; the remaining two, do not accept this contention.
    
[[Adi Shankara|Shankara]] explains that in ''Sampat Upasana'' there is the imposing (''aropa'') of a superior character on the inferior whereas in ''Pratika (adhyasa) Upasana'' the inferior form is contemplated as [[Brahman]]. ''Āropa '' or illusion is 'mis-cognition' (''[[Avidya (Hinduism)|avidyā]]''), 'mis-appearance' (''avabhāsa''), 'superimposition' (''[[Adhyasa|adhyāsa]]''), a 'misapplication' or a 'mis-presentation' which is not consciously persuaded unlike misperception and misunderstanding; and in which, neither the agent nor the subject have any active role to play. But, Aropa is not Adhyasa because there has to be an appearance which can make the delusive illusory appearance of a particular appearance a distinct possibility.<ref>{{cite book|title=the Philosophy of Sankar’s Advaita Vedanta|author=Shyamam Kumar Chattopadhyaya|publisher=Sarup & Sons|pages=64, 86, 164|url=https://books.google.co.in/books?id=IPasbJW-1PwC&pg=PA64&dq=Aropa++Vedanta&hl=en&sa=X&ei=7u68VKqrFOjKmAXlk4KYCg&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=Aropa%20%20Vedanta&f=false }}</ref> [[Badarayana]] states that:-
 
[[Adi Shankara|Shankara]] explains that in ''Sampat Upasana'' there is the imposing (''aropa'') of a superior character on the inferior whereas in ''Pratika (adhyasa) Upasana'' the inferior form is contemplated as [[Brahman]]. ''Āropa '' or illusion is 'mis-cognition' (''[[Avidya (Hinduism)|avidyā]]''), 'mis-appearance' (''avabhāsa''), 'superimposition' (''[[Adhyasa|adhyāsa]]''), a 'misapplication' or a 'mis-presentation' which is not consciously persuaded unlike misperception and misunderstanding; and in which, neither the agent nor the subject have any active role to play. But, Aropa is not Adhyasa because there has to be an appearance which can make the delusive illusory appearance of a particular appearance a distinct possibility.<ref>{{cite book|title=the Philosophy of Sankar’s Advaita Vedanta|author=Shyamam Kumar Chattopadhyaya|publisher=Sarup & Sons|pages=64, 86, 164|url=https://books.google.co.in/books?id=IPasbJW-1PwC&pg=PA64&dq=Aropa++Vedanta&hl=en&sa=X&ei=7u68VKqrFOjKmAXlk4KYCg&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=Aropa%20%20Vedanta&f=false }}</ref> [[Badarayana]] states that:-
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==References ==
 
==References ==
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[[Category:Vedas]]
   
[[Category:Vedanta]]
 
[[Category:Vedanta]]
[[Category:Advaita Vedanta]]
   
[[Category:Dvaita]]
 
[[Category:Dvaita]]
 
[[Category:Sanskrit words and phrases]]
 
[[Category:Sanskrit words and phrases]]
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<references />
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[[Category:Darshanas]]

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