Pramanas in Astika Darshanas (आस्तिकदर्शन-प्रमाणानि)

Pramanas in Astika Darshanas (Samskrit : आस्तिकदर्शन-प्रमाणानि) refers to discussion about the number and kind of pramanas accepted particularly by the Astika Darshanas which are six in number, viz., Samkhya, Yoga, Nyaya, Vaiseshika, Purva and Uttara Mimamsa texts.

It is generally admitted by all the schools of philosophy, both Astika and later schools of Nastika also that prama is the true knowledge and pramana is the instrument of such knowledge. However, difference of opinions exist as to the the nature of the pramana which each of them has used to explain valid cognition.

Introduction

Pramana, the instrument of valid cognition is one of the most unique concepts that have originated on Bharatavarsha. As we see in the table, all Astika darshanas admit at least three of the Shad Pramanas accepted namely, Pratyaksha, Anumana and Shabda.

Some Darshanas like Nyaya and Samkhya have clearly explained their stance on the acceptance of the Pramana, whereas others such as Uttara Mimamsa (Brahmasutras) have not clearly stated so. That these pramanas have been accepted by them has to be inferred from the sutras which are the basis of the commentaries. While Pramanas for Nastika darshanas, Pauranika and Tantrika darshanas are also mentioned in the table they are beyond the scope of this article.

The sutras and commentaries which explain the various Pramanas accepted by each of the Astika Shad Darshanas are henceforth addressed in this context.

Samkhya (3 Pramanas)

Samkhya and Yoga concepts of pramana are different and original from the others such as those given by Nyaya. Samkhya admits 3 Pramanas and their lakshanas are discussed in the sutras as given below.

प्रत्यक्षम् ॥ Pratyaksha

यत् संबद्धं सत् तदाकारोल्लेखि विज्ञानं तत् प्रत्यक्षं । सांख्यसूत्र-१.८९ । (प्रत्यक्षलक्षणं)

yat saṁbaddhaṁ sat tadākārōllēkhi vijñānaṁ tat pratyakṣaṁ । sāṁkhyasūtra-1.89 । (pratyakṣalakṣaṇaṁ)

Pratyaksha (perception) is that discernment which, being in conjunction (with the thing perceived), portrays the form just as it is perceived.

अनुमानम् ॥ Anumana

प्रतिबन्धदृशः प्रतिबद्धज्ञानमनुमानं । सांख्यसूत्र-१.१०० । (अनुमान लक्षणं)

pratibandhadr̥śaḥ pratibaddhajñānamanumānaṁ । sāṁkhyasūtra-1.100 । (anumāna lakṣaṇaṁ)

The knowledge of the connected object (e.g., fire), through perception of the connecting aspect (e.g., of fire with smoke), is Anumana pramana (Inference).

शब्दः ॥ Shabda

आप्तोपदेशः शब्दः । सांख्यसूत्र-१.१०१ । (शब्द लक्षणं)

āptōpadēśaḥ śabdaḥ । sāṁkhyasūtra-1.101 । (śabda lakṣaṇaṁ)

Aptopadesa (the specific words or testimony) is a declaration by one worthy (to be believed) and constitutes Shabda Pramana (Verbal Testimony).

Samkhya Karika

Samkhya Karikas also explain the 3 pramanas accepted as seen in the Karika below.

दृष्टमनुमानमाप्तवचनं च सर्वप्रमाणसिद्धत्वात् । त्रिविधं प्रमाणमिष्टं प्रमेयसिद्धि: प्रमाणाद्धि ॥ ४ ॥ (Samk. Kari. 4)

dr̥ṣṭamanumānamāptavacanaṁ ca sarvapramāṇasiddhatvāt । trividhaṁ pramāṇamiṣṭaṁ prameyasiddhi: pramāṇāddhi ॥ 4 ॥ (Samk. Dars. 4)

Pramana or proof being established are intended to be three-fold. From these the Prameya (something to be proved) is established.

• प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणाः || pratyaksha-pramana (perception)
• अनुमानप्रमाणाः || anumana-pramana (inference)
• आप्तवचनम् || aptavacana (word/testimony of reliable sources) Vachana being शब्दप्रमाणाः । sabda-pramana.

Yoga (3 Pramanas)

Yoga Darshana similar to Samkhya accepts 3 Pramanas as given by Patanjali, the composer of Yogasutras, and the explanation by Vyasa Bhashya. Clearly all three pramanas are mentioned in one sutra (1.7).

Pratyaksha, Anumana and Agama

प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमाः प्रमाणानि ॥७॥ pratyakṣānumānāgamāḥ pramāṇāni ॥7॥ (Yoga. Sutr. 1.7)

Pratyaksha (Perception), Anumana (Inference) and Agama (Verbal testimony) are Pramanas. Vyasa Bhasya

इन्द्रियप्रणालिकया चित्तस्य बाह्यवस्तूपरागात्तद्विषया सामान्यविशेषात्मनोऽर्थस्य विशेषावधारणप्रधाना वृत्तिः प्रत्यक्षं प्रमाणम् । फलमविशिष्टः पौरुषेयश्चित्तवृत्तिबोधः ।

indriyapraṇālikayā cittasya bāhyavastūparāgāttadviṣayā sāmānyaviśēṣātmanō'rthasya viśēṣāvadhāraṇapradhānā vr̥ttiḥ pratyakṣaṁ pramāṇam । phalamaviśiṣṭaḥ pauruṣēyaścittavr̥ttibōdhaḥ ।

अनुमेयस्य तुल्यजातीयेष्वनुवृत्तो भिन्नजातीयेभ्यो व्यावृत्तः सम्बन्धो यस्तद्विषया सामान्यावधारणप्रधाना वृत्तिरनुमानम् । यथा देशान्तरप्राप्तेर्गतिमच्चन्द्रतारकं चैत्रवत्, विन्ध्यश्चाप्राप्तिरगतिः ।

anumēyasya tulyajātīyēṣvanuvr̥ttō bhinnajātīyēbhyō vyāvr̥ttaḥ sambandhō yastadviṣayā sāmānyāvadhāraṇapradhānā vr̥ttiranumānam । yathā dēśāntaraprāptērgatimaccandratārakaṁ caitravat, vindhyaścāprāptiragatiḥ ।

आप्तेन दृष्टोऽनुमितः वा अर्थः परत्र स्वबोधसङ्क्रान्तये शब्देनोपदिश्यते । शब्दात्तदर्थविषया वृत्तिः श्रोतुरागमः । यस्याश्रद्धेयार्थो वक्ता न दृष्टानुमितार्थः स आगमः प्लवते । (Vyay. Bhas. for Yoga. Sutr. 1.7)

āptēna dr̥ṣṭō'numitaḥ vā arthaḥ paratra svabōdhasaṅkrāntayē śabdēnōpadiśyatē । śabdāttadarthaviṣayā vr̥ttiḥ śrōturāgamaḥ । yasyāśraddhēyārthō vaktā na dr̥ṣṭānumitārthaḥ sa āgamaḥ plavatē । (Vyay. Bhas. for Yoga. Sutr. 1.7)

Summarizing the Vyasa Bhashya given above, an object naturally has generic (सामान्या) and specific (विशेषः) attributes. The Pratyaksha pramama considers the specific aspect of the object. Chitta when affected by the external object through the path of sense-organs gives rise to a function with the specific attribute of that object. Such a function is called Pratyaksha pramana. The effect of Pratyaksha pramana ultimately is that the Purusha cognises the function of Chitta (चित्तवृत्तिबोधः).

Further Anumana or Inference is explained. There is a certain relationship which is common (अनुवृत्तिः) to all homogenous objects (तुल्यजातीयेषु) and dissociated (व्यावृत्तः) from the heterogenous ones (भिन्नजातीयेषु). Anumana is that function having the above said relationship for its object concerned chiefly with the ascertainment (अवधारणप्रधाना) of its generic attribute. For e.g. a person, say Chaitra, changes his position only through movement. Similarly when we see planets changing their positions we infer that there is movement, just like in Chaitra, which cannot be perceived. On the other hand, Vidhya mountain does not change its position so we infer that there is no movement.

A certain object, having been either perceived or inferred by an authoritative person, is verbally expressed for the sake of transferring that cognition to another person. Vrtti (function of the object) generated by verbal transfer of cognition is Agama for the listener. That Agama given by an untrustworthy person, who has neither seen nor inferred an object fails.

It is to be noted that while Samkhya and other darshanas use the word Shabda Pramana, Yoga uses 'Agama'. Yoga holds that pramana is the function of chitta (the state of mind). Samkhya considers knowledge as belonging to buddhi only, which though essentially is insentient, acts like a sentient entity when the sentience of Purusha is reflected upon it. Both these systems offer an original definition of pramana as the function of the buddhi or chitta.

Vaiseshika (3 Pramanas)

Vaiseshika Darshana discusses pramanas indirectly observed through the following compilation of sutras. Like Samkhya Vaiseshika also accepts Pratyaksha, Anumana and Shabda Pramana (called here as Amnaya).

आम्नाय ॥ Amnaya

तद्वचनादाम्नायस्य प्रामाण्यम् । वैशेषिक-१,१.३ ।

tadvacanādāmnāyasya prāmāṇyam । vaiśēṣika-1,1.3 ।

The authoritativeness of the Veda (arises from its) being the word of the supreme being. The words तद्वचनाद्। tadvachanād means being the composition of Him, Ishvara; आम्नायस्य। of the Veda (Vedas are also called Amnaya) the pramanyam or proof is established.

अनुमानम् ॥ Anumana

अस्येदं कार्यं कारणं संयोगि विरोधि समवायि चेति लैङ्गिकम् । वैशेषिक-९,२.१ ।

asyēdaṁ kāryaṁ kāraṇaṁ saṁyōgi virōdhi samavāyi cēti laiṅgikam । vaiśēṣika-9,2.1 ।

It is the effect or cause of, conjunct with, contradictory to, or combined in, this (cognition produced by the mark of inference). लैङ्गिकम् । Laingikam means produced from Linga or mark. This mark is the medium or instrument of Anumana (inferential cognition) of the Lingi or object (connected to that mark).(Page 279 of Reference )

अस्येदं कार्य कारणसम्बन्धश्चावयवाद्भवति । वैशेषिक-९,२.२ ।

asyēdaṁ kārya kāraṇasambandhaścāvayavādbhavati । vaiśēṣika-9,2.2 ।

This sutra explains the relationship between Inference and the law of cause and effect (कार्य कारणसम्बन्ध).

एतेन शाब्दं व्याख्यातम् । वैशेषिक-९,२.३ । ētēna śābdaṁ vyākhyātam । vaiśēṣika-9,2.3 ।

Hereby verbal cognition is explained. (Page 282 of Reference )

हेतुरपदेशो लिङ्गं प्रमाणं करणमित्यनर्थान्तरम् । वैशेषिक-९,२.४ । (Vais. Sutr. 9.2.12)

hēturapadēśō liṅgaṁ pramāṇaṁ karaṇamityanarthāntaram । vaiśēṣika-9,2.4 । (Vais. Sutr. 9.2.12)

Hetu (हेतुः । reason), Apadesha (अपदेशः । sound or word), Lingam (लिङ्गम् । mark), Pramana (प्रमाणम् । proof), Karana (करणम् । instrument) these are not antonyms. (Page 286 of Reference )

Nyaya (4 Pramanas)

According to Nyaya darshana, pramana is the unique operative cause (karana) of pramaa or right knowledge. It is the complex of specific conditions or causes (karana), other than the subject and the object, which invariably produces valid knowledge.

प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपमानशब्दाः प्रमाणानि ।। ३ ।। {प्रमाणौद्देशसूत्रम्} pratyakṣānumānopamānaśabdāḥ pramāṇāni ।। 3 ।। {pramāṇauddeśasūtram}

Pramana is of four kinds as per Nyaya. Apart from the three pramanas accepted by Samkhya, Yoga and Vaiseshika, Nyaya accepts the fourth one Upamana. All the four pramanas are explicitly defined by Gautama in his Nyayasutras.

इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षोत्पन्नं ज्ञानं अव्यपदेश्यं अव्यभिचारि व्यवसायात्मकं प्रत्यक्षम्।।४।। {प्रत्यक्षलक्षणम्} indriyārthasannikarṣotpannaṁ jñānaṁ avyapadeśyaṁ avyabhicāri vyavasāyātmakaṁ pratyakṣam।।4।। {pratyakṣalakṣaṇam}

अथ तत्पूर्वकं त्रिविधं अनुमानं पूर्ववत्शेषवत्सामान्यतोदृष्टं च।।५।। {अनुमानलक्षणम्} atha tatpūrvakaṁ trividhaṁ anumānaṁ pūrvavatśeṣavatsāmānyatodr̥ṣṭaṁ ca।।5।। {anumānalakṣaṇam}

प्रसिद्धसाधर्म्यात्साध्यसाधनं उपमानम् ।।६।। {उपमानलक्षणम्} prasiddhasādharmyātsādhyasādhanaṁ upamānam ।।6।। {upamānalakṣaṇam}

आप्तोपदेशः शब्दः ।।७।। {शब्दलक्षणम्} āptopadeśaḥ śabdaḥ ।।7।। {śabdalakṣaṇam}

All these are dealt with in detail in Shad Pramanas.

Purva Mimamsa

Jaimini, the author of Mimasa sutras admits three pramanas — perception (pratysksa) inference (anumana) and testimony (sabda). Prabhakara adds two more pramanas - Comparison (upamana) and implication (arthapatti) and raises the number of pramanas into five. Kumarila admits all these five and adds another pramana - non- apprehension (anupalabdhi) and thus we find six pramanas there in Mimamsa.

Jaimini Mimamsa Sutras

Jaimini's Mimamsa sutras firmly affirm that Vedas are the source of Dharma and explain in detail the pramanatva (authoritativeness) of Vedas and Smrtis. However, with respect to pramanas, they do not explicitly define their acceptance but indirectly explain many of them. Pratyaksha pramana is, nevertheless, directly dealt with as given below.

प्रत्यक्षम् ॥ Pratyaksha

सत्संप्रयोगे पुरुषस्येन्द्रियाणां बुद्धिजन्म तत्प्रत्यक्षम्...१,१.४ (Mima. Sutr. 1.1.4)

A contact between an object and indriyas generates Knowledge for Purusha and it is called Pratyaksha. (See Page 21 of Reference).

शब्दः ॥ Shabda - Vedas

औत्पत्तिकस् तु शब्दस्यार्थेन संबन्धस् तस्य ज्ञानम् उपदेशोऽव्यतिरेकश् चार्थेऽनुपलब्धे तत्प्रमाणं बादरायणस्यानपेक्षत्वात् -१.१.५

On the other hand, the relation of the word with its meaning is eternal. Consequently Upadesha (injunctions or vedopadesa) is the means of knowing dharma and it is undeviated in regard to objects not perceived by other means of knowledge. It is authoritative specially as it is independent according to Badarayana. (See Page 23 of Reference).

शब्दः ॥ Shabda - Smrtis

अपि वा कर्तृसामान्यात् प्रमाणम् अनुमानं स्यात् -१,३.२

But on account of Karta (teacher and preacher of Veda and Smrtis) being the same, inference would be that Smrti is also pramana just like the Vedas. By this sutra it can be understood that Anumana is also a pramana accepted by Mimamsakaras. (See Page 72 of Reference ).

Shabara Bhasya

While Pratyaksha, and Shabda pramanas have been explicitly mentioned in the sutras, the others such as Anumana, Upamana and Arthapatti are not expressed in sutras in Mimamsa. The authoritative commentary of Mimamsa Sutras, the Shabara bhyasya, gives the explanations for those not having the sutras.

अनुमानम् ॥ Anumana

अनुमानं ज्ञातसम्बन्धस्यैकदेशदर्शनादेकदेशान्तरेऽसन्निकृष्टेऽर्थे बुद्धिः। तत्तु द्विविधं- प्रत्यक्षतोदृष्टसंबन्धं, सामान्यतोदृष्टसंबन्धम् च। प्रत्यक्षतोदृष्टसंबन्धं यथा, धूमाकृतिदर्शनादग्न्याकृतिविज्ञानम्। सामान्यतोदृष्टसंबन्धं यथा, देवदत्तस्य गतिपूर्विकां देशान्तरप्राप्तिमुपलभ्यादित्यगतिस्मरणम्।

When the perception of one factor of a well-recognized relationship leads to the cognition of the other factor of that relationship - which latter is not in contact with the person's sense-organs- this second cognition is what is called as Anumana or Inference (inferential Cognition). The term Jnatasambandha here is used in the sense of "well-congnized relationship". Anumana is of two kinds, that based upon

1. A directly perceived relationship. Example, Anumana of Fire following the cognition of Smoke (invariable concomitance of Smoke and Fire which has been directly perceived in the kitchen).
2. A generalized relationship. Example, Inference of movement of the Sun on the finding that only after he moves he changes his position - this is realized on the experience that in the case of the person Devadatta we have found that it led us to the generalized premise that "whenever an object changes position it moves".

उपमानम् ॥ Upamana

उपमानमपि, सादृश्यम् असन्निकृष्टेऽर्थे बुद्धिमुत्पादयति। यथा गवयदर्शनं गोस्मरणस्य।

Upamana, Analogy (based on Similies) also brings about the cognition of things not in contact with the senses. For instance, the sight of the Gavaya (which is similar to the cow) brings about the remembrance of the cow (due to its similarity to the Gavaya).

अर्थापत्तिः ॥ Arthapatti

अर्थापत्तिरपि - दृष्टः, श्रुतो वार्थोऽन्यथा नोपपद्यते इत्यर्थकल्पना। यथा, जीवति देवदत्ते गृहाभावदर्शनेन बहिर्भावस्यादृष्टस्य कल्पना ॥

arthāpattirapi - dr̥ṣṭaḥ, śruto vārtho'nyathā nopapadyate ityarthakalpanā। yathā, jīvati devadatte gr̥hābhāvadarśanena bahirbhāvasyādr̥ṣṭasya kalpanā॥

According to Shabara Bhashya : Arthapatti "presumption" also consists of in the presuming of something not seen, on the ground that a fact already perceived or heard, would not be possible without that presumption; for instance, it is found that Devadatta who is alive is not in the house, and this 'non-existence in the house' leads to the presumption that he is somewhere outside the house (without which the fact of his being alive and not in the house could not be explained).

Regarding the views on Arthapatti, Kumarila and Prabhakara differ from each other. According to Prabhakara in a case where the well ascertained perception of a thing cannot be explained without the assumption of another thing and it is that presumption which constitutes Arthapatti (also called as Implication and Postulation). According to Kumarila when something is otherwise unintelligible, the assumption of what will make it intelligible is Arthapatti. Prabhakara holds that there is an element of doubt in Arthapatti, while Kumarila denies it. Kumarila admits two types of Arthapatti

1. दृष्टः - Drsta Arthapatti : Presumption based on what is seen
2. श्रुतिः - Shruti Arthapatti : Presumption based on what is heard

Prabhakara does not admit Shruti Arthapatti.

अभावः ॥ Abhava

अभावोऽपि प्रमाणाभावो, नास्ति- इत्यस्यार्थस्यासन्निकृष्टस्य।।

Abhava, "negation", "non-apprehension" stands for the non-existence (non-operation) of the means of cognition and this is what brings about the cognition that "it does not exist", in regard to things not in contact with the senses.

Prabhakara Mimamsa (5 Pramanas)

Prabhakara Mimamsa while accepting the 4 Pramanas and Arthapatti does not accept the Abhava Pramana.

प्रमाणमनुभूतिः, सा स्मृतेरन्या, न सा स्मृतिः । न प्रमाणं स्मृतिः पूर्वप्रतिपत्तिव्यपेक्षणात्। (Prakaranapanchika)

Prabhakara Mimamsikas, define prama or valid knowledge as immediate experience (Anubhuti). It is different from smrti or memory which is the impression of past experiences. That is to say 'valid cognition' is Apprehension. Hence according to them the truth of knowledge, praamaanya is guaranteed by its having the characteristic of immediacy.

Bhatta Mimamsa (6 Pramanas)

Bhatta Mimamsa accepts the 6th Pramana namely Anupalabdhi and Slokavartika explains his view of the siddhanta.

Uttara Mimamsa or Vedanta

शब्दाद् एव प्रमितः । ( ब्रसू-१,३.२३ । )

From the very word the being is measured. (Page 111 of the Book)

आनुमानिकम् अप्य् एकेषाम् इति चेन् न शरीर-रूपक-विन्यस्त-गृहीतेर् दर्शयति च । ( ब्रसू-१,४.१ । )

That which is inferred (i.e. Pradhana) is also mentioned in some recensions of the texts (katha Upanishad), if it be said no.

दर्शयतश् चैवं प्रत्यक्षानुमाने । ( ब्रसू-४,४.२० । )

Advaitha Vedanta

A more recent text Vedanta Paribhasha discusses Arthapatti as follows

इदानीमर्थापत्तिर्निरूप्यते। तत्रोपपद्यज्ञानेनोपपादककल्पनमर्थापत्तिः। तत्रोपपद्यज्ञानं करणम्, उपपादकज्ञानं फलम्।

Now Arthapatti (Presumption) is being described. It is the assumption of an explanatory fact (upapadaka) from a knowledge of the thing to be explained (upapadya). Here the knowledge of the thing to be explained is the instrument and the knowledge of explanatory fact is the result. (Page 141 of Reference) Shankara Bhashya for Brahma sutra : 3.2.37 talks about Anupalabdhi as an accepted Pramana by Vedantins.

फलमत उपपत्तेः । ( ब्रसू-३,२.३७ । )

Vedantaparibhasha of Dharmaraja Adhvarindra   

Advaita vedanta also defines pramana as the operative cause (kaarana) of prama or ture knowledge. It defines prama in two ways. First, prama means knowledge that has both the characteristics of novelty and uncontradictoriness. This means that true knowledge is uncontradicted and original, i.e. it gives us new information. Secondly, prama simply means uncontradicted knowledge of objects, excluding or including memory.  

Verses and Meanings

Kumarila Bhatta's definition of Pratyaksha pramana based on Jaimini Sutra (1.1.4) is

सम्यगर्थे च संशब्दो दुष्प्रयोगनिवारणः । प्रयोग इन्द्रियाणां च व्यापारोऽर्थेषु कथ्थते ॥

दुष्टत्वाच्छुक्तिकायोगो वार्यते रजतेक्षणात् । एवं सत्यनुवादत्वं लक्षणस्यापि संभवेत् ॥ (Slok. Vart. (for Jaimini Sutra 4) 38-39)

On the basis of the Jaimini Sutra 4, Kumarila defines perception as a knowledge which is the result of the right functioning of the sense organs with reference to their objects. The word "सम्" Sam is used in the sense of "proper" or right; and it serves to exclude out all faulty prayoga. Prayoga here means "functioning" of the senses with reference to their objects. In the case of the perception of silver in mother-of-pearl, the functioning of the sense-organ is faulty. In this way, this sutra may be taken as mere statement of the definition of Pratyaksha (Perception). Kumarila's Arthapatti is defined as

प्रमाणषट्कविज्ञातो यत्राऽर्थो नाऽन्यथा भवेत् । अदृष्टं कल्पयेदन्यं सा ऽर्थापत्तिरुदाहृता ॥ (Slok. Vart. Arthapatti Paricheda 1)