Pramana (प्रमाणम्)

Pramana (Samskrit : प्रमाणम्) is the means or chief instrument of knowing valid knowledge (pramaa (प्रमा)). From the questions like who and what created the universe, determining the nature of objects, sprang an urge for investigation into the real state of things (Tatvajignasa). These queries led to investigation into identifying the criterion of what constitutes valid knowledge and the ways by which objects or things can be cognized ultimately theories of cognition have been formulated. Pramana is a subject that arose from the need to recognize valid knowledge and various theories have been proposed to describe the same.

परिचयः॥ Introduction

All thinkers in general have given their attention to the problem of cognition for a long time. Bharatiya tattva shastras are unique in that Jnana (ज्ञानम् । knowledge), Prama (प्रमा । Right or valid knowledge) and Aprama (अप्रमा । invalid knowledge) are clearly distinct entities. Western tradition defines 'knowledge' as truth, and justified true belief. Indian tradition does not have an equivalent word for belief. In Bharatiya shastras, Prama is explored in the context of fulfilling purusharthas, whereas western traditions do not have such an ultimate goal for exploring knowledge, thus for them knowledge is just for the sake of knowledge. Knowledge and Action are both related to the Mind. However, Action is dependent on the agent and his will (Kartr-tantra) while Knowledge is conditioned by its object (vastu-tantra). When a man decides to travel his will determines the mode of travel and the place to reach. This is not the case of Knowledge, it is independent of the will of the person, a pillar is a pillar and confirms to the vastu or object and does not change even if the someone mistakes it for a man standing.

Here for the sake of clarity, Jnana is considered as general knowledge, which on analysis or cognizance reveals true knowledge is called Prama or valid knowledge, and when this revelation is false it is called aprama or invalid knowledge.  

व्युत्पत्तिः ॥ Etymology

According to Shabdakalpadhruma the term Pramana (प्रमाणम्) is derived from the dhatu मा (मा॒ माने) in the sense of measurement and cognition with an upasarga (prefix) प्र in the sense of प्रकृष्टः and pratyaya (suffix) lyut (ल्युट्). The suffix 'lyut', being in the instrumental case. Pramana means the instrument by which some thing is rightly cognized.

The word Pramana signifies the instrument because (it is derived as) "by this is rightly known" (Pramiyate anena). Loosely the term stands for knowledge as well as for the means of valid knowledge but in Nyaya logic it is generally used in the second sense.

प्रमाणतत्वम् ॥ Pramana Tattva

The tattva or the "true nature of", "the real knowledge about", "property really possessed by object", "assured cognition of an object" ; all these indicate an inquiry into the real state of things or objects. Both "Jnana" and "Prama" indicate some kind of knowledge, however

• ज्ञानम् । Jnana means all kinds of knowledge, true or false. Example: there is a rope or snake.
• यथार्थज्ञानम् । Yatharthajnana or Prama is when reality reveals true knowledge (valid knowledge). Example : knowledge of rope in a rope.
• अप्रमा । Aprama is when reality reveals false knowledge (invalid knowledge). Example : knowledge of snake in a rope.

While Jnana is used to denote knowledge from the psychological standpoint that helps in cognition of an object, Prama is used to indicate true knowledge in the logical sense, which denotes ability of recognizing the real nature and character of an object.

Four basic factors make up the system of recognition. Vatsyayana Bhashya of Nyayasutras defines the 4 components as follows

तत्र यस्येप्साजिहासाप्रयुक्तस्य प्रवृत्तिः स प्रमाता । स येनार्थं प्रमिणोति तत्प्रमाणं । योऽर्थः प्रतीयते तत्प्रमेयं । यदर्थविज्ञानं सा प्रमितिः । चतसृषु चैवंविधास्वार्थतत्वं परिसमाप्यते । (Vats. Bhas. Intro Before Sutra 1)

1. The Prama (प्रमा) or Pramiti : the valid knowledge (of an object), the right understanding
2. The Prameya (प्रमेयः) : the knowable, the object to be known, the object of valid knowledge
3. The Pramana (प्रमाणम्) : the instrument with which Prameya is evaluated and known and is the chief instrument of valid knowledge
4. The Pramaata (प्रमाता) : the knower of object, the cognizer of valid knowledge, one who uses pramana.

Thus a Pramaata (knower of object) validates the Prama (right understanding) of a Prameya (the object to be known) through the means of Pramana (the instrument of that knowledge). All these four are required for the completion of Arthatattva. So it can be said that valid knowledge is not possible if any one of them is absent. Western theories of philosophy use three factors namely, subject, object, and the resultant knowledge. Indian philosophy is distinct and unique in that the means or instrument of valid cognition or knowledge i.e., pramana.

Example : A very simplified common place example of these 4 constituents of Arthatattva may be given as about purchase fruits or vegetables in a market.

• Pramana is the standard weight bar say of 1Kg (means to measure).
• Prameya is the vegetable or fruits which have to be purchased.
• Prama is the definitive knowledge that a particular amount of vegetable weighed is as much as 1 Kg.
• Pramata is the person who is weighing and acquiring this knowledge of a specified quantity of vegetables or fruits of 1 Kg.

प्रमा ॥ Prama

According to Nyaya, as given previously Prama is a definite or certain (असं दिग्धम् । asandigdha), unerring (यथार्थ । yatartha) knowledge and it consists of knowing the object as it is.

Annambhatta in his Tarkasangraha explains, Yatartha jnana is Prama. He clearly defines the difference between Prama and Aprama as follows

॥ तद्वति तप्रकारकोऽनुभवो यथार्थः। यथा रजते इदं रजतमिति ज्ञानम्। सैव प्रमेच्युते ॥१९॥॥ (Tark. Samg. 3.19)

Summary : Thus Prama is that which pertains to यथार्थानुभवः। definite knowledge of an object which is true presentational in character, just as the knowledge an object of silver as "this is silver". Here the knowledge about the quality of silverness (रजतत्वम्) of the object is in toto without any distortion to silver. But knowledge is invalid (अयथार्थ । ayatartha) when a character not possessed by the object of cognition is attributed to that object and is called Aprama.

तदभाववति तत्प्रकारकोऽनुभवोऽयथार्थः। यथा शुक्ताविदं रजतमिति। सैव अप्रमा इत्युच्यते॥२०॥ (Tark. Samg. 3.20)

Summary : When a piece of shell is called "this is silver", then the cognition is invalid. For in this case "silverness" is a quality which does not belong to the shell but is being attributed to it is called Aprama.

Thus Prama has two aspects

1. Nature of the object
2. Test of verification or validity

There are other versions about what constitutes Prama by different Bharatiya shastras.

• Kapila defines Prama as determinate (confirmed after verification) knowledge not known before (अपूर्वनिश्चितज्ञानम्). (Samkhya)
• Prabhakara holds Prama as immediate experience (Anubhuti). (One school of Mimamsa)
• Bhatta mentions Prama as that which pertains to a novel object (Anadhigatatva). (Another school of Mimamsa)
• Advaitins hold that Prama consists of knowledge which is undeniable (Abadhita).

प्रमाणम् ॥ Pramanam

Pramana i.e., the instrument of Prama is the most fundamental and unique about the tattva shastras. Nyaya darshana deals extensively about the siddhantas of jnana (theory of Knowledge). The means of Prama (valid cognition) is termed Pramana as explained by the Vatsyayana bhashya given below.

प्रमाणतोऽर्थप्रतिपत्तौ प्रवृत्तिसामर्थ्थदर्थवत् प्रमाणम् ।... तस्येप्साजिहासाप्रयुक्तस्य समीहा प्रवृत्तिरित्युच्यते । (Vats. Bhas. Intro Before Sutra 1)

Meaning : The effort of the agent (man) stimulated by the desire to acquire (Ipsa । ईप्सा) and the desire to get rid of the thing (जिहासा । Jihasa roga etc) is what is called प्रवृत्तिः (pravrtti । exertion). Two of these together inspire the agent into Prvritti or Action. (Page 20 of Reference )

अर्थस्तु सुखं सुखहेतुः दुखं दुखहेतुश्च । (Vats. Bhas. Intro Before Sutra 1)

Summary : The अर्थ (object or thing) cognised by means of Pramana, or the instrument of cognition is of four kinds, viz., Pleasure, Source of Pleasure, Pain, Source of Pain. These objects of cognition, however, are innumerable owing to the fact of the number of living creatures being infinite. (Page 22 of Reference ) According to another scholar Pramana is defined as प्रकृष्टरूपेण अनुमाति अनेन (Page 12 of Reference )

"To know an object correctly is a kind of proper measurement of an object. 'knowing' is metaphorically called 'measuring' through our cognition. As a valid cognition gives us a picture of a particular object, it may be described as 'intellectual measurement'."

Pramana and Pramanabhasa

The means of knowledge have reference to an object. Pramiina produces valid knowledge, the object of which exists in the actual world, whereas, Pramanabhasa produces only illusory knowledge.

प्रमाणसङ्ख्या ॥ Number of Pramanas

Pramanas though are ten in number, six of them (Shad Pramanas) are accepted by astika schools of darshanas are discussed here.

1. प्रत्यक्षम् ॥ Pratyaksha (perception)
2. अनुमानम् ॥ Anumana (inference)
3. शब्दः ॥ Shabda or aagama (verbal testimony)
4. उपमानम् ॥ Upamana (comparison)
5. अर्थापत्तिः ॥ Arthaapatti (presumption)
6. अभावः ॥ Abhaava (negation or non-apprehension)

Gautama in his Nyayasutras lays down that there are four kinds of Pramanas. Pratyaksha (Perception), Anumana (Inference), Upamana (Analogy) and Shabda (Words) are the Pramanas. (Page 36 of Reference )

प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपमानशब्दाः प्रमाणानि ।।३।। {प्रमाणौद्देशसूत्रम्} (Nyay. Sutr. 1.1.3)

प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणम् ॥ Pratyaksha Pramana

Pratyaksha pramana (Samskrit : प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणम्) is made of two words Prati and Aksha, which literally means "In front of the eyes". Knowledge which is produced by the contact of a sense-organ with an object is pratyaksha.

Pratyaksha pramana is the primary and fundamental of all the sources of valid knowledge and it is universally recognized so by all schools of philosophy. According to Nyaya , perception is not the only source of our knowledge, but is the basis of the other sources or means of knowledge.

Perception is a source of direct knowledge and leads one to apprehend the reality. All other means of knowledge are indirect sources of apprehending reality. Example: When the sense-organ, i.e. eye, comes in direct contact with a pot, there arises a perceptual knowledge of pot.

According to Nyaya Sutra

इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षोत्पन्नं ज्ञानं अव्यपदेश्यं अव्यभिचारि व्यवसायात्मकं प्रत्यक्षम् ।।४।।{प्रत्यक्षलक्षणम्} (Nyay. Sutr. 1.1.4)

According to Vatsyayana Bhasyam of Nyaya sutra (1.1.4)

इन्द्रियस्यार्थेन सन्निकर्षाद् उत्पद्यते यत् ज्ञानं, तत् प्रत्यक्षम् ॥ (Vats. Bhas. Nyay. Sutr. 1.1.4) (Page 59 of Reference )

Meaning : Sense perception is that cognition which is

1. produced by the contact (सन्निकर्षाद्) of the sense organ (इन्द्रियम्) with the object (अर्थेः).
2. अव्यपदेश्यं not expressible by words
3. अव्यभिचारि not erroneous, non-deviatedness
4. व्यवसायात्मकं doubtless with crystal clear clarity (well-defined)

The constant connection of the means of valid cognition (Pramana) with the object (artha) is called nondeviatedness (अव्यभिचारित्वम्)

According to Annambhatta's Tarkasangraha

इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षजन्यं ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षम्।

अनुमानप्रमाणम् ॥ Anumana Pramana

The second instrument of valid knowledge is Anumana Pramana.

According to Nyaya sutras

अथ तत्पूर्वकं त्रिविधं अनुमानं पूर्ववत् शेषवत् सामान्यतोदृष्टं च ।।५।। {अनुमानलक्षणम्} (Nyay. Sutr. 1.1.5)

Meaning : After perception comes Inference which is led up to by perception; it is of three kinds - Purvavat (पूर्ववत्), Sheshavat (शेषवत्), and Samanyatodrshtam (सामान्यतोदृष्टम्). The meaning of the above sutra is explained by Vatsyayana bhashya as follows

तत्पूर्वकमित्यनेन लिङ्गलिङ्गिनोः संबन्धदर्शनं लिङ्गदर्शनं चाभिसंबध्यते । लिङ्गलिङ्गिनोः संबध्द्योर्दर्शनेन लिङ्गस्मृतिरभिसंबध्यते । स्मृत्या लिङ्गदर्शनेन चाऽप्रत्यक्षः अर्थः अनुमीयते । (Vats. Bhas. Nyay. Sutr. 1.1.5) (Page 65 of Reference )

Meaning : The expression तत्पूर्वकम् meaning 'led up to perception' refers to the darshana (perception obtained through the indriyas and manas) of the relation between the Linga (लिङ्ग । mark) and Lingi (लिङ्गि । object indicated by the mark) and also darshana of Linga itself. The darshana of the relation between linga (mark) and lingi (object) also implies Smrti (स्मृतिः । remembrance) of linga. Thus by means of Smrti and darshana of Linga (mark) the Apratyaksha (अप्रत्यक्षः । non-perceptible) object (अर्थः) is inferred (अनुमानम् । anumana). (Page 26 of Reference). Thus anumana depends totally on previous experiences through pratyaksha and this knowledge follows other kinds of knowledge. Example : where there is smoke there is fire. Tarkasamgraha defines Anumana as

अनुमितिकरणमनुमानम्॥१॥ परामर्शजन्यं ज्ञानमनुमितिः॥२॥ व्याप्तिविशिष्टपक्षधर्मताज्ञानं परामर्शः ।

Anumana is of three kinds with each of them having two definitions with elaborately described examples by Vatsyayana for the Nyaya Sutras given by Gautama.

Purvavat (पूर्ववत्)

पूर्ववदिति, यत्र कारणेन कार्य्यमनुमीयते। यथा मेधोन्नत्या भविष्यति वृष्टिरिति । (Vats. Bhas. Nyay. Sutr. 1.1.5) (Page 65 and 66 of Reference )

Purvavat Anumana is that in which the effect is inferred from the cause; e.g. when we see the clouds rising, we infer that there will be rain. The cause is 'purva' or prior to the effect ; hence that in which the Anumana is based on the cognition of the cause has been called Purvavat. (Page 26 of Reference )

अथवा पूर्ववदिति, यत्र यथा पूर्व्वं प्रत्यक्षभूतयोः अन्यतरदर्शनेन अन्यतरस्य अप्रत्यक्षस्य अनुमानम् । यथा धूमेनाग्निरिति । (Vats. Bhas. Nyay. Sutr. 1.1.5) (Page 65 and 66 of Reference )

Purvavat Anumana is that in which out of two things perceived on some former occasion, perception of one of the two things leads to inference of the other (which is not being perceived); e.g. when fire is inferred from smoke. (Page 26 of Reference )

Sheshavat (शेषवत्)

शेषवत् यत्र कार्य्येण कारणमनुमीयते । पूर्व्वोदकविपरीतमुदकं, नद्याः पूर्णत्वमं, शीध्रत्वञ्च दृष्ट्वा स्रोतसोऽनुमीयते भूता वृष्टिरिति । (Vats. Bhas. Nyay. Sutr. 1.1.5) (Page 65 and 66 of Reference )

Sheshavat Anumana is that in which the cause is inferred from the effect; e.g. when we see that the water of the river is not like what it used to be, and that the stream is fuller and the current swifter, we infer that there has been rain in the catchment areas. (Page 26 of Reference )

शेषवत् नाम परिशेषः, स च प्रसक्तप्रतिषेधेऽन्यत्र अप्रसाङ्गात् शिष्यमाणे सम्प्रत्ययः । यथा सदनित्यमित्येवमादिना द्रव्यगुणकर्मणामविशेषेण सामान्यविशेषसमवायेभ्यो विभक्तस्य शब्दस्य तस्मिन् द्रव्यकर्मगुणसंशये न द्रव्यमेकद्रव्यत्वात्, न कर्म शब्दान्तरहेतुत्वात्, यस्तु शिष्यते, सोऽयमिति शब्दस्य गुणत्वप्रतिपत्तिः । (Page 65 and 66 of Reference )

The word sheshavat means remainder; with regard to an object there are certain possibilities - and some of these possibilities are eliminated; and there being no other possibilities - when the remaining possibility is cognised in relation to the said object, this cognition is Sheshavat. e.g. with regard to Sound, we find that it is an real entity (सत्) and is transient (अनित्यमम्) etc; and as these properties (being an entity and being transient etc) are found to be common to Substances (द्रव्यम्), Qualities (गुणः) and Actions (कर्म) only, their presence in Sound distinguishes it from the remaining categories of the Commoness (सामान्यम्), Specialness (विशेष्यम्) and Samavaya (समवाय । Pervasiveness) (all of which are three entities, but eternal). Now there arises a doubt as to whether Sound is a Substance, a Quality or an Action. This doubt is reasoned (by the process of elimination) in the following manner :

• Sound cannot be a Substance (द्रव्यम्), because it pervades in a single substance (Akasha). No other dravya is pervasive only in one dravya. All Substances are either not inherent in any dravya (e.g. Atman) or inherent in more than one dravya (e.g. a jar).
• Sound is not an Action (कर्म), because it is the originator of another sound, thus it gives rise to something that is of its own kind which is never the case with any action.
• Sound is thus a Quality (गुणः) arrived at by the process of elimination of the other two. (Page 27 of Reference )

Samanyatodrshtam (सामान्यतोदृष्टम्)

सामान्यतो दृष्टं व्रज्यापूर्वकम् अन्यत्र दृष्टस्य अन्यत्र दर्शनमिति तथा चाऽऽदित्यस्य । तस्मात् अस्ति अप्रत्यक्षा अपि आप्यादित्यस्य व्रज्येति। (Page 65 and 66 of Reference )

Samanyatodrsta Anumana (is that in which the inference is based on a general observation) e.g. we have observed in all cases that we see a thing in a place different from where we saw it before only when it has moved; from such general observation we infer that the sun must be moving, even though we cannot perceive it. (Page 26 of Reference )

सामान्यतो दृष्टं नाम, यत्राप्रत्यक्षे लिङ्गलिङ्गिनोः सम्बन्धे केनचिदर्थेन लिङ्गस्य सामान्यादप्रत्यक्षो लिङ्गी गमयते । यथेच्छादिभिरात्मा । इच्छादयो गुणाः । गुणाश्च द्रव्यसंस्थानाः । तद्यदेषां स्थानं स आत्मेति ।(Page 65 and 66 of Reference )

Samanyatodrsta Anumana is that in which, the relation between the Linga and Lingi being imperceptible, the imperceptible Lingi is inferred from the similarity of the Linga to something else. e.g. When the Atma is inferred from Desire. Desire is a Quality and Qualities always inhere in substances. Similarity of Desire to other qualities which inhere in substances, leads to the Anumana that that Substance in which Desire inheres is the Atma. (Page 27 of Reference )

Shabda Pramana

Shabda literally means verbal knowledge. Shabda pramana is also called as Agama pramana, sastra pramana according to the school of thought. "sabdha vijnanata samyag sannikrsharta anubhavah agamaha" that evidence about objects realized by the power of words and sentences is called Shabhda pramana.  This knowledge depends on reliable authority and also on aakaksha, yogyata and aasatti of a sentence. Different sounds such as those arising from musical instruments and bamboos also contribute to the realization of this knowledge. "Agama," literally means "that which has come", contextually it means that evidence which is realized by the process of understanding scriptures from rishis who constitute reliable authority.  Agama pramanas are divided in two parts - Apaurusheya and Paurusheya. Vedas, upanishadas, puranas, dharma sastras, and smritis are "apaurusheya,” or of non human origin.   The words of rishis and elders constitute "paurusheya pramanas.   Basically paurusheya pramanas ultimately do not contradict the Vedas.

Shabda pramana is designated in various ways by the different schools of Indian system. Thus, it is "shabda", according to Naiyayikas, "Shastra" according to Mimaamsakas, "Aptavachana" according to Samkhyaists and "Aagama" to Vedantins.

Upamana Pramana

The knowledge of similarity is generated by Upamana. This knowledge arises by the use of comparison of two things and the presence of some common factors in a thing. However, the word Upamana has been translated variously as comparison, analogy, identification, knowledge by similarity and knowledge by assimilation. It is derived from the words Upa meaning saadrisya or similarity and maana meaning cognition.

A person, who has perceived a cow in a town goes to a forest, and perceives a wild cow. He has an apprehension "this animal is similar to a cow" owing to the meeting of his eyes with the animal.. This knowledge of similarity of a cow with a wild cow is acquired by comparison.

Arthaapatti Pramana

Arthapatti is the presumption of something for the explanation of a known fact. The word arthaapatti gies under various translations as presumption, postulation, supposition, implication, and assumption. When a given or perceived fact cannot be explained without some other fact we have to presuppose or postulate the existence of this other fact even though we do not perceive it. Example : when a particular person named Chaitra, known to be alive, is not found in his house, it is assumed that he must be somewhere outside. What is presumed is said to be a distinct source of knowledge.

Anupalabdhi Pramana

Knowledge by which we immediately cognize the non-existence of an object, e.g. absence of rainfall indicates that the connection of cloud and the wind has not happened.