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=== Svartha and Parartha (स्वार्थपरार्थश्च) ===

=== Svartha and Parartha (स्वार्थपरार्थश्च) ===

An inference is called svartha when it aims at the knowledge of an unperceived object on the part of a man who employs that inference. In this kind of inference a man seeks only to reach the conclusion for himself by relating it to the major and minor premises. An example of this is when a man first notices a mass of smoke on a hill and then recalls that smoke and fire have a universal relationship, leading him to conclude that there is fire there.   

An inference is called svartha when it aims at the knowledge of an unperceived object on the part of a man who employs that inference. In this kind of inference a man seeks only to reach the conclusion for himself by relating it to the major and minor premises. An example of this is when a man first notices a mass of smoke on a hill and then recalls that smoke and fire have a universal relationship, leading him to conclude that there is fire there.   

 

Whereas, an inference is considered parartha when it is intended to convince others of the validity of the conclusion. In this inference there is a justification of the conclusion through a justification of the middle term that leads to it. It is here specifically pointed out that the same middle term, which is universally related to the major is also  present in the minor term. The conclusion is thus found to follow necessarily from a synthesis of the major and minor premises. This synthesis is embodied in a third premise which relates the minor, middle and major terms of the inference. A parartha anumana is illustrated when a man, having inferred the existence of fire in a hill lays it down as a thesis and proves it as a conclusion following from the major and minor premises and their combination into a third premise.  

Whereas, an inference is considered parartha when it is intended to convince others of the validity of the conclusion. In this inference there is a justification of the conclusion through a justification of the middle term that leads to it. It is here specifically pointed out that the same middle term, which is universally related to the major is also  present in the minor term. The conclusion is thus found to follow necessarily from a synthesis of the major and minor premises. This synthesis is embodied in a third premise which relates the minor, middle and major terms of the inference. A parartha anumana is illustrated when a man, having inferred the existence of fire in a hill lays it down as a thesis and proves it as a conclusion following from the major and minor premises and their combination into a third premise.  

=== Purvavat, Sheshavat and Samanyatodrshta (पूर्ववत् शेषवत् सामान्यतोदृष्ट) ===

===Purvavat, Sheshavat and Samanyatodrshta (पूर्ववत् शेषवत् सामान्यतोदृष्ट)===

[[File:Karnena Karyanumanam.jpg|thumb|209x209px|Purvavat Anumana:- Infering the effect through the cause.

[[File:Karnena Karyanumanam.jpg|thumb|209x209px|Purvavat Anumana:- Infering the effect through the cause.

Image Courtesy:- Monali V. Chandelkar (Image created using Chatgpt)]]

Image Courtesy:- Monali V. Chandelkar (Image created using Chatgpt)]]In the Nyaya-Sutra inference is distinguished into three kinds, namely, purvavat, sheshavat and samanyatodrshta. There are different views with regard to the nature of these inferences. According to one view, a purvavat inference is that in which we infer the unperceived effect from a perceived cause. Here the linga or the middle term is related to the sadhya or the major term as its cause and is, therefore, antecedent to it. In this inference we pass from the knowledge of the antecedent cause to that of the consequent effect. This is illustrated when from the presence of dark heavy clouds in the sky we infer that there will be rainfall. A sheshavat inference is that in which we infer the unperceived cause from a perceived effect. Here the middle term is related as an effect to the major term and is, therefore, consequent to it In this inference we pass from the knowledge of the effect-phenomenon to that of the antecedent causal phenomenon. This is illustrated in the inference of previous rain from the rise of the water in the river and its swift muddy current. It will be observed here that in both purvavat and sheshavat inferences the vyapti or the universal relation between the major and middle terms is a uniform relation of causality between them. These in