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==Smriti and Anubhava ॥ स्मृतिअनुभवश्च==

==Smriti and Anubhava ॥ स्मृतिअनुभवश्च==

[[File:Buddhi .png|thumb|343x343px]]

[[File:Buddhi .png|thumb|343x343px|Image Courtesy:- Monali V. Chandelkar (Image created Using Canva)]]

Anubhava contains presentational knowledge about objects, which we see as being imparted to us. It is unique in nature and does not reproduce prior knowledge about objects. On the other hand, smriti is not a representation of different things; rather, it is a reproduction of events that have occurred in the past. for example, Hari saw his father sowing a mango seed, that action happening in front of him is his anubhava which while recalling that same activity after few days, will become smriti. There are two kinds of anubhava: Yathartha anubhava (the anubhava which correlates with reality is called as yathartha anubhava) for example, if we see a dog on the road and cognize ‘this is a dog’ and if this cognition corresponds to the actual presence of a dog, and your pratyaksha (sense perception) was not defective, then it is yathartha anubhava. The second type of anubhava is ayathartha anubhava (the one which does not correlate with reality). For example you see a long black colored thing on ground and think 'this is a snake’ but in reality, it is a rope, not a snake. Here the cognition that this is a snake is not in accordance with the actual object. The pratyaksha (sense perception) is defective, often due to conditions like poor lighting, distance, or similarity in appearance. Therefore, it is an ayathartha anubhava. Of these the former is called pramā and includes all cases of true presentational knowledge of objects.  

Anubhava contains presentational knowledge about objects, which we see as being imparted to us. It is unique in nature and does not reproduce prior knowledge about objects. On the other hand, smriti is not a representation of different things; rather, it is a reproduction of events that have occurred in the past. for example, Hari saw his father sowing a mango seed, that action happening in front of him is his anubhava which while recalling that same activity after few days, will become smriti. There are two kinds of anubhava: Yathartha anubhava (the anubhava which correlates with reality is called as yathartha anubhava) for example, if we see a dog on the road and cognize ‘this is a dog’ and if this cognition corresponds to the actual presence of a dog, and your pratyaksha (sense perception) was not defective, then it is yathartha anubhava. The second type of anubhava is ayathartha anubhava (the one which does not correlate with reality). For example you see a long black colored thing on ground and think 'this is a snake’ but in reality, it is a rope, not a snake. Here the cognition that this is a snake is not in accordance with the actual object. The pratyaksha (sense perception) is defective, often due to conditions like poor lighting, distance, or similarity in appearance. Therefore, it is an ayathartha anubhava. Of these the former is called pramā and includes all cases of true presentational knowledge of objects.  

There are four different types of prama, according to Nyaya: pratyaksha, anumiti, upamiti, shabda. and there are four pramanas, or tools, to comprehend this prama knowledge: pratyakṣa, anumana, upamana and shabda.

There are four different types of prama, according to Nyaya: pratyaksha, anumiti, upamiti, shabda. and there are four pramanas, or tools, to comprehend this prama knowledge: pratyaksha, anumana, upamana and shabda.

==Understanding the four pramanas ॥ चत्वारि प्रमाणानि ==

==Understanding the four pramanas ॥ चत्वारि प्रमाणानि ==

'''Pratyksha pramana-''' In simple terms pratyksha pramana is the valid knowledge produced by the contact of an object with a sense organ. pratyaksha as In Navya-Nyāya (founded by Gangesha Upādhyāya in Tattvacintāmaṇi), is redefined and refined using a highly technical and precise logical-epistemological framework.  

'''Pratyksha pramana-''' In Tarkasangraha Pratyksha pramana is defined as 

 

 

In simple terms pratyksha pramana is the valid knowledge produced by the contact of an object with a sense organ. pratyaksha as In Navya-Nyāya (founded by Gangesha Upādhyāya in Tattvacintāmaṇi), is redefined and refined using a highly technical and precise logical-epistemological framework.  

'''Anumana pramana-''' Anumana means such knowledge as follows some other knowledge. It is the knowledge of an object due to previous knowledge of some sign.

'''Anumana pramana-''' Anumana means such knowledge as follows some other knowledge. It is the knowledge of an object due to previous knowledge of some sign.

'''Upamana pramana -''' The word upamana is derived from the words upa, meaning sādṛśya or similarity, and mana, meaning cognition. Hence, upamana deritavely means the knowledge of the similarity between two things. As a pramāṇa, upamāna is the source of our knowledge about the relation between a word and its denotation (saṃjñāsaṃjñisambandhajñānamupamitiḥ). For example, if someone does not know what a metro is, they may be told by a resident that it is like a train. The next time that person sees such a vehicle in the city, he knows that it is the metro.  

'''Upamana pramana -''' The word upamana is derived from the words upa, meaning sādṛśya or similarity, and mana, meaning cognition. Hence, upamana deritavely means the knowledge of the similarity between two things. As a pramāṇa, upamāna is the source of our knowledge about the relation between a word and its denotation. For example, if someone does not know what a metro is, they may be told by a resident that it is like a train. The next time that person sees such a vehicle in the city, he knows that it is the metro.  

'''Shabda pramana-''' Shabda literally means verbal knowledge. It is the knowledge of objects derived from words or sentences. All verbal knowledge, however, is not valid; hence, shabda, as a pramana, is defined in the Nyaya as valid verbal testimony. It consists of the assertion of a trustworthy person. A verbal statement is valid when it comes from a person who knows the truth and speaks the truth about anything for the guidance of the other person. (āptavākyam śabdaḥ)

'''Shabda pramana-''' Shabda literally means verbal knowledge. It is the knowledge of objects derived from words or sentences. All verbal knowledge, however, is not valid; hence, shabda, as a pramana, is defined in the Nyaya as valid verbal testimony. It consists of the assertion of a trustworthy person. A verbal statement is valid when it comes from a person who knows the truth and speaks the truth about anything for the guidance of the other person. आप्तवाक्यम्  शब्दः । āptavākyam śabdaḥ

==Types of inference ॥ अनुमानस्य प्रकाराः==

==Types of inference ॥ अनुमानस्य प्रकाराः==

[[File:Svartha parartha.png|thumb|377x377px|Image Courtesy: Image is created using canva]]

[[File:Svartha parartha.png|thumb|377x377px|Image Courtesy: Monali V. Chandelkar (Image is created using canva)]]

An inference in Indian logic is a combined deductive and inductive process comprising at least three categorical propositions. We therefore do not classify inferences into deductive and inductive, direct and intermediary, syllogistic and non-syllogistic, pure and mixed. The naiyayikas give us three different classifications of inference. According to the first, inference is of two kinds, namely, svartha and parartha. According to another classification, inference is said to be of three kinds, namely, purvavat, sheshavat, and samanyatodrsta. This classification has reference to the nature of the vyapti or the universal relation between the middle and major terms of inference. Purvavat and sheshavat inferences are based on causal uniformity, while samanyatodrshta is based on non-causal uniformity. According to a third classification, inference is distinguished into kevalanvayi, kevala-vyatireki and anvaya-vyatireki. This classification is more logical in as much as it depends on the nature of the induction by which we get the knowledge of vyapti or the universal proposition involved in reference.  

An inference in Indian logic is a combined deductive and inductive process comprising at least three categorical propositions. We therefore do not classify inferences into deductive and inductive, direct and intermediary, syllogistic and non-syllogistic, pure and mixed. The naiyayikas give us three different classifications of inference. According to the first, inference is of two kinds, namely, svartha and parartha. According to another classification, inference is said to be of three kinds, namely, purvavat, sheshavat, and samanyatodrsta. This classification has reference to the nature of the vyapti or the universal relation between the middle and major terms of inference. Purvavat and sheshavat inferences are based on causal uniformity, while samanyatodrshta is based on non-causal uniformity. According to a third classification, inference is distinguished into kevalanvayi, kevala-vyatireki and anvaya-vyatireki. This classification is more logical in as much as it depends on the nature of the induction by which we get the knowledge of vyapti or the universal proposition involved in reference.  

[[File:Karnena Karyanumanam.jpg|thumb|209x209px|Purvavat Anumana:- Infering the effect through the cause.

[[File:Karnena Karyanumanam.jpg|thumb|209x209px|Purvavat Anumana:- Infering the effect through the cause.

Image Courtesy:- Image created using Chatgpt]]

Image Courtesy:- Monali V. Chandelkar (Image created using Chatgpt)]]

Kevalanvayi, kevala-vyatireki and anvaya-vyatireki (केवलान्वयी, केवल व्यतिरेकी, अन्वय व्यतिरेकी)

 

=== Kevalanvayi, Kevala-vyatireki and Anvaya-vyatireki (केवलान्वयी, केवल व्यतिरेकी, अन्वय व्यतिरेकी) ===