Difference between revisions of "Pramanas in Astika Darshanas (आस्तिकदर्शन-प्रमाणानि)"

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Prabhakara Mimamsikas, define prama or valid knowledge as immediate experience (Anubhuti). It is different from smriti or memory  which is the impression of past experiences. (pramanamanubhutihi sa smrteranyaa PP, p.42). Hence according to them the truth of knowledge, praamaanya is guaranteed by its having the characteristic of immediacy.
 
Prabhakara Mimamsikas, define prama or valid knowledge as immediate experience (Anubhuti). It is different from smriti or memory  which is the impression of past experiences. (pramanamanubhutihi sa smrteranyaa PP, p.42). Hence according to them the truth of knowledge, praamaanya is guaranteed by its having the characteristic of immediacy.
  
=== '''Bhatta Mimamsa (6 Pramanas)''' ===
+
=== Bhatta Mimamsa (6 Pramanas) ===
 
Bhatta Mimamsa, considers prama or true knowledge as the primary and original knowledge (anaadigata). Hence pramaana is that which gives us new knowledge, i.e. a true cognition of objects of which we have no experience in the past. The method of knowledge must be concerned in knowing what has not been previously known. It has no new contents but refers only to the already acquired contents of knowledge. (yathaarthamagrhitagraahitknaanam pranam iti SD pg 45) Thus pramana is that which gives us new knowledge, i.e. a true knowledge of the past (anadhigataarthaabhutarthanischayatmakam pramanam SD pg 123)
 
Bhatta Mimamsa, considers prama or true knowledge as the primary and original knowledge (anaadigata). Hence pramaana is that which gives us new knowledge, i.e. a true cognition of objects of which we have no experience in the past. The method of knowledge must be concerned in knowing what has not been previously known. It has no new contents but refers only to the already acquired contents of knowledge. (yathaarthamagrhitagraahitknaanam pranam iti SD pg 45) Thus pramana is that which gives us new knowledge, i.e. a true knowledge of the past (anadhigataarthaabhutarthanischayatmakam pramanam SD pg 123)
  

Revision as of 13:52, 12 November 2018

Pramanas in Astika Darshanas (Samskrit : आस्तिकदर्शन-प्रमाणानि) refers to discussion about the number and kind of pramanas accepted particularly by the Astika Darshanas which are six in number, viz., Samkhya, Yoga, Nyaya, Vaiseshika, Purva and Uttara Mimamsa texts.

It is generally admitted by all the schools of philosophy, both Astika and later schools of Nastika also that prama is the true knowledge and pramana is the instrument of such knowledge. However, difference of opinions exist as to the the nature of the pramana which each of them has used to explain valid cognition.

Introduction

Pramanas Accepted by Various Darshana Shastras

Pramana, the instrument of valid cognition is one of the most unique concepts that have originated on Bharatavarsha. As we see in the table, all Astika darshanas admit at least three of the Shad Pramanas accepted namely, Pratyaksha, Anumana and Shabda.

Some Darshanas like Nyaya and Samkhya have clearly explained their stance on the acceptance of the Pramana, whereas others such as Uttara Mimamsa (Brahmasutras) have not clearly stated so. That these pramanas have been accepted by them has to be inferred from the sutras which are the basis of the commentaries. While Pramanas for Nastika darshanas, Pauranika and Tantrika darshanas are also mentioned[1] in the table they are beyond the scope of this article.

The sutras and commentaries which explain the various Pramanas accepted by each of the Astika Shad Darshanas are henceforth addressed in this context.

Samkhya (3 Pramanas)

Samkhya and Yoga concepts of pramana are different and original from the others such as those given by Nyaya. Samkhya admits 3 Pramanas and their lakshanas are discussed in the sutras as given below

यत् संबद्धं सत् तदाकारोल्लेखि विज्ञानं तत् प्रत्यक्षं । सांख्यसूत्र-१.८९ । (प्रत्यक्षलक्षणं)[2]

yat saṁbaddhaṁ sat tadākārōllēkhi vijñānaṁ tat pratyakṣaṁ । sāṁkhyasūtra-1.89 । (pratyakṣalakṣaṇaṁ)

Pratyaksha (perception) is that discernment which, being in conjunction (with the thing perceived), portrays the form just as it is perceived.

प्रतिबन्धदृशः प्रतिबद्धज्ञानमनुमानं । सांख्यसूत्र-१.१०० । (अनुमान लक्षणं)[2]

pratibandhadr̥śaḥ pratibaddhajñānamanumānaṁ । sāṁkhyasūtra-1.100 । (anumāna lakṣaṇaṁ)

The knowledge of the connected object (e.g., fire), through perception of the connecting aspect (e.g., of fire with smoke), is Anumana pramana (Inference).

आप्तोपदेशः शब्दः । सांख्यसूत्र-१.१०१ । (शब्द लक्षणं)[2]

āptōpadēśaḥ śabdaḥ । sāṁkhyasūtra-1.101 । (śabda lakṣaṇaṁ)

Aptopadesa (the specific words or testimony) is a declaration by one worthy (to be believed) and constitutes Shabda Pramana (Verbal Testimony). Samkhya Karikas also explain the 3 pramanas accepted as seen in the Karika below.[3]

दृष्टमनुमानमाप्तवचनं च सर्वप्रमाणसिद्धत्वात् । त्रिविधं प्रमाणमिष्टं प्रमेयसिद्धि: प्रमाणाद्धि ॥ ४ ॥ (Samk. Kari. 4)[4]

dr̥ṣṭamanumānamāptavacanaṁ ca sarvapramāṇasiddhatvāt । trividhaṁ pramāṇamiṣṭaṁ prameyasiddhi: pramāṇāddhi ॥ 4 ॥ (Samk. Dars. 4)

Pramana or proof being established are intended to be three-fold. From these the Prameya (something to be proved) is established.

  • प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणाः || pratyaksha-pramana (perception)
  • अनुमानप्रमाणाः || anumana-pramana (inference)
  • आप्तवचनम् || aptavacana (word/testimony of reliable sources) Vachana being शब्दप्रमाणाः । sabda-pramana.

Yoga (3 Pramanas)

Yoga Darshana similar to Samkhya accepts 3 Pramanas as given by Patanjali with the explanation by Vyasa.

प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमाः प्रमाणानि ॥७॥ pratyakṣānumānāgamāḥ pramāṇāni ॥7॥ (Yoga. Sutr. 1.7)[5]

Pratyaksha (Perception), Anumana (Inference) and Agama (Verbal testimony) are Pramanas.

Vyasa Bhasya

इन्द्रियप्रणालिकया चित्तस्य बाह्यवस्तूपरागात्तद्विषया सामान्यविशेषात्मनोऽर्थस्य विशेषावधारणप्रधाना वृत्तिः प्रत्यक्षं प्रमाणम् । फलमविशिष्टः पौरुषेयश्चित्तवृत्तिबोधः ।

indriyapraṇālikayā cittasya bāhyavastūparāgāttadviṣayā sāmānyaviśēṣātmanō'rthasya viśēṣāvadhāraṇapradhānā vr̥ttiḥ pratyakṣaṁ pramāṇam । phalamaviśiṣṭaḥ pauruṣēyaścittavr̥ttibōdhaḥ ।

अनुमेयस्य तुल्यजातीयेष्वनुवृत्तो भिन्नजातीयेभ्यो व्यावृत्तः सम्बन्धो यस्तद्विषया सामान्यावधारणप्रधाना वृत्तिरनुमानम् । यथा देशान्तरप्राप्तेर्गतिमच्चन्द्रतारकं चैत्रवत्, विन्ध्यश्चाप्राप्तिरगतिः ।

anumēyasya tulyajātīyēṣvanuvr̥ttō bhinnajātīyēbhyō vyāvr̥ttaḥ sambandhō yastadviṣayā sāmānyāvadhāraṇapradhānā vr̥ttiranumānam । yathā dēśāntaraprāptērgatimaccandratārakaṁ caitravat, vindhyaścāprāptiragatiḥ ।

आप्तेन दृष्टोऽनुमितः वा अर्थः परत्र स्वबोधसङ्क्रान्तये शब्देनोपदिश्यते । शब्दात्तदर्थविषया वृत्तिः श्रोतुरागमः । यस्याश्रद्धेयार्थो वक्ता न दृष्टानुमितार्थः स आगमः प्लवते । (Vyay. Bhas. for Yoga. Sutr. 1.7)[5]

āptēna dr̥ṣṭō'numitaḥ vā arthaḥ paratra svabōdhasaṅkrāntayē śabdēnōpadiśyatē । śabdāttadarthaviṣayā vr̥ttiḥ śrōturāgamaḥ । yasyāśraddhēyārthō vaktā na dr̥ṣṭānumitārthaḥ sa āgamaḥ plavatē । (Vyay. Bhas. for Yoga. Sutr. 1.7)

Summarizing the Vyasa Bhashya given above an object naturally has generic (सामान्या) and specific (विशेषः) attributes. The Pratyaksha pramama considers the specific aspect of the object. Chitta when affected by the external object through the path of sense-organs gives rise to a function with the specific attribute of that object. Such a function is called Pratyaksha pramana. The effect of Pratyaksha pramana ultimately is that the Purusha cognises the function of Chitta (चित्तवृत्तिबोधः).[6]

Further Anumana or Inference is explained. There is a certain relationship which is common (अनुवृत्तिः) to all homogenous objects (तुल्यजातीयेषु) and dissociated (व्यावृत्तः) from the heterogenous ones (भिन्नजातीयेषु). Anumana is that function having the above said relationship for its object concerned chiefly with the ascertainment (अवधारणप्रधाना) of its generic attribute. For e.g. a person, say Chaitra, changes his position only through movement. Similarly when we see planets changing their positions we infer that there is movement, just like in Chaitra, which cannot be perceived. On the other hand, Vidhya mountain does not change its position so we infer that there is no movement.[6]

A certain object, having been either perceived or inferred by an authoritative person, is verbally expressed for the sake of transferring that cognition to another person. Vrtti (function of the object) generated by verbal transfer of cognition is Agama for the listener. That Agama given by an untrustworthy person, who has neither seen nor inferred an object fails.[6]

It is to be noted that while Samkhya and other darshanas use the word Shabda Pramana, Yoga uses 'Agama'. Yoga holds that pramana is the function of chitta. Samkhya considers knowledge as belonging to buddhi only, which though essentially is insentient, acts like a sentient entity when the sentience of Purusha is reflected upon it. Both these systems offer an original definition of pramana as the function of the buddhi or chitta.

Vaiseshika (3 Pramanas)

Vaiseshika Darshana discusses pramanas indirectly observed through the following compilation of sutras. Like Samkhya Vaiseshika also accepts Pratyaksha, Anumana and Shabda Pramana (called here as Amnaya)

तद्वचनादाम्नायस्य प्रामाण्यम् । वैशेषिक-१,१.३ ।[7]

tadvacanādāmnāyasya prāmāṇyam । vaiśēṣika-1,1.3 ।

The authoritativeness of the Veda (arises from its) being the word of the supreme being.[8] The words तद्वचनाद्। tadvachanād means being the composition of Him, Ishvara; आम्नायस्य। of the Veda (Vedas are also called Amnaya) the pramanyam or proof is established.

अस्येदं कार्यं कारणं संयोगि विरोधि समवायि चेति लैङ्गिकम् । वैशेषिक-९,२.१ ।[7]

asyēdaṁ kāryaṁ kāraṇaṁ saṁyōgi virōdhi samavāyi cēti laiṅgikam । vaiśēṣika-9,2.1 ।

It is the effect or cause of, conjunct with, contradictory to, or combined in, this (cognition produced by the mark of inference). लैङ्गिकम् । Laigikam means produced from Linga or mark. This mark is the medium or instrument of Anumana ( inferential cognition) of the Lingi or object (connected to that mark).(Page 277 of Reference [8])

अस्येदं कार्य कारणसम्बन्धश्चावयवाद्भवति । वैशेषिक-९,२.२ ।

asyēdaṁ kārya kāraṇasambandhaścāvayavādbhavati । vaiśēṣika-9,2.2 ।

This sutra explains the relationship between Inference and the law of cause and effect (कार्य कारणसम्बन्ध).

एतेन शाब्दं व्याख्यातम् । वैशेषिक-९,२.३ ।

ētēna śābdaṁ vyākhyātam । vaiśēṣika-9,2.3 ।

Hereby verbal cognition is explained.

हेतुरपदेशो लिङ्गं प्रमाणं करणमित्यनर्थान्तरम् । वैशेषिक-९,२.४ । (Vais. Sutr. 9.2.12)[7]

hēturapadēśō liṅgaṁ pramāṇaṁ karaṇamityanarthāntaram । vaiśēṣika-9,2.4 । (Vais. Sutr. 9.2.12)

Nyaya (4 Pramanas)

According to Nyaya darshana, pramana is the unique operative cause (kaarana) of pramaa or right knowledge. It is the complex of specific conditions or causes (karana), other than the subject and the object, which invariably produces valid knowledge.

प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपमानशब्दाः प्रमाणानि ।। ३ ।। {प्रमाणौद्देशसूत्रम्}

Pramana constitutes

Purva Mimamsa

Mimamsa sutras firmly affirm that Vedas are the source of Dharma. They consider

Pratyaksha Pramana

सत्संप्रयोगे पुरुषस्येन्द्रियाणां बुद्धिजन्म तत्प्रत्यक्षम्...१,१.४ (Mima. Sutr. 1.1.4)[9]

A contact between an object and indriyas generates Knowledge for Purusha and it is called Pratyaksha.[10] Shabda Pramana - Vedas

औत्पत्तिकस् तु शब्दस्यार्थेन संबन्धस् तस्य ज्ञानम् उपदेशोऽव्यतिरेकश् चार्थेऽनुपलब्धे तत्प्रमाणं बादरायणस्यानपेक्षत्वात् -१.१.५[9]

On the other hand, the relation of the word with its meaning is eternal. Consequently Upadesha (injunctions or vedopadesa) is the means of knowing dharma and it is undeviated in regard to objects not perceived by other means of knowledge. It is authoritative specially as it is independent according to Badarayana. Page 23 of Link Shabda Pramana - Smrtis

अपि वा कर्तृसामान्यात् प्रमाणम् अनुमानं स्यात् -१,३.२

But on account of Karta (teacher and preacher of Veda and Smrtis) being the same, inference would be that Smrti is also pramana just like the Vedas. By this sutra it can be inferred that Anumana is also a pramana accepted by Mimamsakaras. Page 72 of Link

Prabhakara Mimamsa (5 Pramanas)

प्रमाणमनुभूतिः सा स्मृतिः

See Reference [10] for sloka and translation.

Prabhakara Mimamsikas, define prama or valid knowledge as immediate experience (Anubhuti). It is different from smriti or memory which is the impression of past experiences. (pramanamanubhutihi sa smrteranyaa PP, p.42). Hence according to them the truth of knowledge, praamaanya is guaranteed by its having the characteristic of immediacy.

Bhatta Mimamsa (6 Pramanas)

Bhatta Mimamsa, considers prama or true knowledge as the primary and original knowledge (anaadigata). Hence pramaana is that which gives us new knowledge, i.e. a true cognition of objects of which we have no experience in the past. The method of knowledge must be concerned in knowing what has not been previously known. It has no new contents but refers only to the already acquired contents of knowledge. (yathaarthamagrhitagraahitknaanam pranam iti SD pg 45) Thus pramana is that which gives us new knowledge, i.e. a true knowledge of the past (anadhigataarthaabhutarthanischayatmakam pramanam SD pg 123)

Uttara Mimamsa or Vedanta

शब्दाद् एव प्रमितः । ( ब्रसू-१,३.२३ । )

आनुमानिकम् अप्य् एकेषाम् इति चेन् न शरीर-रूपक-विन्यस्त-गृहीतेर् दर्शयति च । ( ब्रसू-१,४.१ । )

दर्शयतश् चैवं प्रत्यक्षानुमाने । ( ब्रसू-४,४.२० । )

Advaitha Vedanta

Advaita vedanta also defines pramana as the operative cause (kaarana) of prama or ture knowledge. It defines prama in two ways. First, prama means knowledge that has both the characteristics of novelty and uncontradictoriness. This means that true knowledge is uncontradicted and original, i.e. it gives us new information. Secondly, prama simply means uncontradicted knowledge of objects, excluding or including memory.  [11][12]

Reference

  1. Harh, Amal Kumar. (1994) Ph. D Thesis Title : The Means of knowing a negative fact a critical study on the theory of Anupalabdhi in Indian philosophy. (Chapter 2) University of North Bengal
  2. 2.0 2.1 2.2 Samkhya Sutras
  3. Sinha, Nandalal (1915) The Sacred Books of the Hindus : The Samkhya Philosophy. (Volume XI). Allahabad : The Panini Office
  4. Samkhya Karikas
  5. 5.0 5.1 Yoga Sutras with Vyasa Bhasya (Samadhi Pada 1)
  6. 6.0 6.1 6.2 Mm. Ganganatha Jha. (1907) The Yoga Darsana. The Sutras of Patanjali with the Bhasya of Vyasa. Translated into English with Notes (Pada 1)
  7. 7.0 7.1 7.2 Vaiseshika Sutras
  8. 8.0 8.1 Pt. Nandalal Sinha. (1923) The Vaiseshika Sutras of Kanada. Allahabad : The Panini Office
  9. 9.0 9.1 Mimamsa Sutras
  10. 10.0 10.1 MM. Ganganatha Jha. Mimamsa Translation
  11. Brahma Sutra
  12. Brahma Sutras With Sankara Bhasyam